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CHESTER ROHRLICH t
There is no need to enter upon any philosophical speculation as to the
nature of a corporation : to recognize, as equity does, that at all times be-
neath the cloak of the corporate entity there exist the stockholders. 2 Gen-
erally what is good for them is good for their corporation, and conversely
what is good for the corporation is good for its stockholders. But what is
good, in business as in morals, is not always beyond debate. Differences
of opinion as to the proper course of corporate conduct are therefore inevi-
table. Unanimity is also not infrequently prevented by the fact that each
stockholder gives weight to factors that interest him alone and not neces-
sarily solely in his capacity of stockholder in the particular corporation. In-
deed, in view of the network of corporations that now pervades life a person
is not infrequently in direct competition with corporations whose stock he
owns. These conflicts of opinion and interest are in most cases settled
within the corporation,3 but the resort to courts by dissatisfied minorities
is an increasingly common practice.
I
EQUITABLE INTERVENTION '
In approaching the problem of when and to what extent courts of equity
will interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation, it seems expedient first
to note the "general principles", so that we may thereafter better appreciate
the different lines of thought available to a chancellor faced with the facts
of a particular controversy.
tLL. B., New York University, 1921; member of New York Bar; contributor to
numerous legal periodicals; at present engaged in the preparation of a series of articles on
various phases of corporate control.
"See Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality (1932) 32 Col. L. REV.
643.
2"But who is the Company? A mere entity created by law, without body or soul,
endowed with capacity to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, in trust for the use and
benefit of the natural Dersons of whom it is composed in proportion of their several interests
therein. But its property belongs in equity to the corporators ..... .Hence, courts of equity
look beyond the artificial creature in whom is the legal title to the real persons whom it
represents." Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. 48, 5o (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1883). See
Revlock Supply Co. v. Troxell, 281 Pa. 424, 126 At. 744 (1924) ; WoRmsER, DisREARD 6F
THE COEPORATE FicTION (1929); WARREN, COpORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORA-
TION ('929).
I See Rohrlich, Corporate Voting: Majority Control, shortly to be published in ST.
JOHN'S L. REv.
I Intervention may be negative as well as positive. A decree in defendant's favor does
not necessarily establish that the court did not intervene.
(692)
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The starting dictum is that "a court of equity has no visitorial powers
over corporations, except such as may be expressly conferred on it by stat-
ute." " The first breach made in this absolute rule was that equity would at
the instance of stockholders give redress against ultra vires acts.6 The
proposition that equity would interfere in cases of ultra vires acts had its con-
verse that "so long as the corporation keeps within the limits of its charter"
equity would not interfere.
7
The simple test of power did not long suffice. The chancellor was soon
faced with charges of abuse of power. He thereupon imposed upon those
who had the power the obligation not to act fraudulently or in bad faith. The
opinion in Ervin v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Company 1 indicates
the many threads that are intertwined in the present-day concept of the
power of equity to intervene in intra-corporate controversies.
"Plainly, the defendants have assumed to exercise a power be-
longing to the majority, in order to secure personal profit for them-
selves, without regard to the interests of the minority. They repudiate
the suggestion of fraud, and plant themselves upon their rights as a
majority to control the corporate interests according to their discretion.
They err if they suppose that a court of equity will tolerate a discretion
which does not consult the interests of the minority. It cannot be de-
nied that minority stockholders are bound hand and foot to the majority
in all matters of legitimate administration of the corporate affairs;
and the courts are powerless to redress many forms of oppression prac-
ticed upon the minority under the guise of legal sanction, which fall
short of actual fraud. This is a consequence of the implied contract
of association by which it is agreed, in advance, that a majority shall
bind the whole body as to all transactions within the scope of the cor-
porate powers. . .. When a number of stockholders combine to
constitute themselves a majority in order to control the corporation as
they see fit, they become for all practical purposes the corporation it-
self, and assume the trust relation occupied by the corporation towards
its stockholders. . . . The corporation itself holds its property as a
trust fund for the stockholders who have a joint interest in all its
property and effects, and the relation between it and its several mem-
bers is, for all practical purposes, that of trustee and cestui que trust." 1
Latimer v. Eddy, 46 Barb. 61, 67 (N. Y. 1864). In this article we shall in the main
confine ourselves to non-statutory powers of equity. Some attempt has been made to fix
the right of minority stockholders to resort to equity by statute, e. g., GA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) § 2224.
6For collections of cases see 3 CooK; CORPORATrONS (8th ed. 1923) § 669; 13 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPOArIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) §§ 5823-5828; 4 THomPsoN, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) §2906-29o8. As the result of increasingly liberal general corporation
statutes and the use of the broadest possible terminology in certificates of incorporation,
the problem of ultra vires is now of slight importance. See (1932) 45 HAV. L. REV. 1393.
It will not be treated further in this article. The problems with which we will be con-
cerned are those arising out of the exercise of powers which concededly exist.7 Fountain Ferry Turnpike Road Co. v. Jewell, 8 B. Mon. 140, 145 (Ky. 1848).
827 Fed. 62.5 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886).
"Id. at 63o-63I.
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We have here the three major concepts which a court of equity must
now reconcile and apply to the facts before it: (i) the majority are supreme
in the management of the purely business affairs of the corporation; (2) the
majority may not commit frauds; and (3) the minority are the beneficiaries
of a trust.
Madsen v. Burns Bros.10 affords a good illustration of the application
of the first of these concepts. In 193o, Burns Bros. sustained a loss of
almost $I,400,OOO and the owners of a small minority of its stock thereupon
petitioned for the appointment of a receiver to the end that the corporation
cease doing business." The court dismissed the complaint, saying:
"Whether the business of a corporation should be operated at a
loss during a business depression, or close down at a smaller loss, is a
purely business and economic problem to be determined by the direc-
tors, and not by the court." 12
In a leading case 13 the same view was expressed as follows:
"It is not, however, every question of mere administration or pol-
icy in which there is a difference of opinion among the shareholders
that enables the minority to claim that the action of the majority is
oppressive, and which justifies the minority in coming to a court of
equity to obtain relief. Generally, the rule must be that in such cases
the will of the majority shall govern. The court would not be justified
in interfering even in doubtful cases, where the action of the majority
might be susceptible of different constructions. . . . Otherwise the
court might be called upon to balance probabilities of profitable results
to arise from the carrying out of the one or the other of the different
plans proposed by or on behalf of different shareholders in a corpora-
tion and to decree the adoption of that line of policy which seemed to
10 io8 N. J. Eq. 275, 155 Atl. 28 (1931).
"The petition was filed under Section 65 of the New Jersey Corporation Act which
authorizes any stockholders owning at least io% of the capital stock of a corporation
to petition the court of chancery, which is given the power to enjoin the transaction of
business and appoint a receiver if it is satisfied that the corporation's "business has been
and is being conducted at a great loss and greatly prejudicial to the interests of its creditors
or stockholders, so that its business cannot be conducted with safety to the public and
advantage to the stockholders." Although the proceedings were statutory the remarks
of the chancellor are couched in general equity phraseology.
SSatpra note IO, at 279. The case also involved the propriety of a debt-funding opera-
tion. The court held that this too was a "business and economic" problem upon which "the
judgment of the majority of the board of directors must prevail in the absence of fraud,
ultra vires, illegality, or a showing of inala fides or abuse of power tantamount to fraud."
The court found that the corporation was not insolvent and that the loss was not due to
mismanagement. But it has been said that "losses resulting from ignorant or even foolish
mismanagement cannot be recovered". Smith v. Chase & Baker Piano Mfg. Co., 197 Fed.
466, 471 (E. D. Mich. 1912). "Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for
equity interference". Leslie v. Lorillard, iiO N. Y. 519, 532, 18 N. E. 363, 365 (1888). For
other cases where courts refused to interfere on the ground that the questions involved were
purely of business policy see Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 49 Wash. 477, 95 Pac.
1O74 (igo8) (expansion of corporation) ; Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Rys. Co., 49 N. J.
Eq. 217, 23 Atl. 287 (1891) (acquisition of competing business) ; Matter of Hinds, Noble &
Eldredge, 172 App. Div. 140, 158 N. Y. Supp. 249 (i916), aff'd 218 N. Y. 715, 113 N. E. 1058
(1916) (change of name) ; Carter v. Spring Perch Co., 113 Conn. 636, 155 Atl. 832 (1931)
(change of place of business and change in quality and price of product).
"Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 2O (189o)'.
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it to promise the best results, or at least to enjoin the carrying out of
the opposite policy. This is no business of any court to follow." 14
The practical justification for this yielding to the majority is found in
the need for efficiency and expedition. The corporation must function. Bet-
ter an erroneous decision than an interminable stalemate. The theoretical
justification is found in the terms of the contract stated to exist between the
stockholders and the corporation as embodied in the charter, by-laws, stat-
utes and common-law. 15
Justification for the intervention of equity to prevent fraud 16 is ob-
vious.. 7  In Flynn v. Brooklyn City Railroad Company, the New York
Court of Appeals said:
"To these general rules [that 'courts have nothing to do with the
internal management of business corporations'], however, there are
some exceptions, and the most important is that founded on fraud.
While courts cannot compel directors or stockholders proceeding by
the vote of a majority, to act wisely, they can compel them to act hon-
estly, or undo their work if they act otherwise. Where a majority of
the directors, or stockholders, or both, acting in bad faith, carry into
effect a scheme which, even if lawful upon its face, is intended to cir-
cumvent the minority stockholders and defraud them out of their legal
rights, the courts interfere and remedy the wrong." 18
The application of the doctrines of trusts to corporations has under-
gone many changes, and the end is not yet. If a trust relationship is found,
"' Id. at 99.
'-See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 765, 770 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6);
Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 266, io8 N. Y. Supp. 978, 981 (09o8), aff'd
192 N. Y. 535, 84 N. E. IIII (i9o8) ; Coox, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §§ 493, 669. The
propriety of treating the mere purchase of a stock certificate as the equivalent of intelligent
consent to all the terms of the "contract" is outside the scope of this article. See infra notes
202, 203, and text.
I Equity "has ever refused to define [fraud] lest the craft of man evade the definition."
Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 26o N. Y. 477, 479 (1933).
1' Most of the cases involving charges of fraud involve interested directors or holding
companies. These are among the major problems in corporation law today, but the limita-
tions of space prevent any special treatment of them in this article. Sed, SPELLMAN, COR-
PORATE DIRECTORS (1931) c. ix; Mound, Suits Alleging Mismnagement of Subsidiaries by
Holding Companies or Parent Companies, published as an appendix to BONBRIGHT AND
MEAN S, T E HOLDING COMPANY (1932); BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (1928) c. viii; Bowman, The Validity of Contracts Between Corporations Having
Common Directors (I9o6) 4 MICH. L. REv. 577; James, Interested Directors in Corporate
Transactions (1931) 6 IND. L. J. 413; Note (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 598.
is 158 N. Y. 493, 507-8, 53 N. E. 520, 524 (i8g9). The complaint in this case was
dismissed because it failed sufficiently to allege a prior demand on the corporation to sue.
In an earlier case, Barr v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 96 N. Y. 444 (1884), the same,
court sustained a complaint by a minority stockholder of a lessor corporation against its
lessee to enforce Dayment of rent under the lease, which alleged that the lessee controlled
the lessor. See also Steinfeld v. Copper State Min. Co., 37 Ariz. 151, 163, 29o Pac. 155, 16o
(193o), where it is suggested that the majority owe to the minority the duty not only to exer-
cise good faith but also to exercise "care and diligence." There is a conflict in the decisions
as to the degree of care to which directors are held. See 2 THOMPSON, COi'RATIONS (3d
ed. 1927) c. 50; Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, II Sup. Ct. 924 (1891); Kavanaugh v.
Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N. Y. 103, 119 N. E. 237 (1918); People v. Mancuso, 255
N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177 (93).
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the jurisdiction of equity follows almost inevitably and the "breach of
trust of one who occupies a fiduciary relation while in the exercise of a
lawful power is as fatal in equity to the resultant act or contract as the
absence of the power." 19 That the corporation itself is a trustee for the
stockholders is well settled. 20  Nor is there any doubt that directors are
"trustees" for the corporation.21 Although it is sometimes stated that they
are trustees "for the stockholders", 22 if this be taken to mean the several
stockholders individually, the statement is not entirely correct.2 3  However,
the problems to be presented in this article involve primarily the relationship
between the majority and the minority. Is it one of trust? At one extreme
is complete denial of the notion that stockholders are trustees for each
other. 24  This view has been vigorously asserted.
"Whenever any action of either directors or stockholders is re-
lied on in a suit by a minority stockholder for the purpose of invoking
the interposition of a court of equity, if the act complained of be neither
ultra vires, fraudulent, nor illegal, the court will refuse its intervention
because powerless to grant it, and will leave all such matters to be dis-
posed of by the majority of the stockholders in such manner as their
interests may dictate, and their action will be binding on all, whether
approved of by the minority or not. . . . The fact that the same per-
sons hold the majority of the stock in both companies does not of itself
enlarge the court's jurisdiction, the act complained of furnishes the
test of jurisdiction, and it must be ultra vires, fraudulent or illegal;
nothing short of this will suffice. . . . They [stockholders] are not
trustees or quasi trustees for each other. . . . And if the proposed
lease be not ultra vires or unlawful or fraudulent, no court, at the in-
stance of a minority stockholder, or at the instance of anyone else, has
the power or the right to restrain the majority from dealing with the
property as they may deem most advantageous to their own interests.
Any other doctrine would put it in the power of a single stockholder,
owning but one share out of many hundreds, to transfer the entire man-
agement of a corporation to a court of equity and would effectually de-
" Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., supra note 15, at 771.
' Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 113 Me. 29.4, 306, 93 Atl. 747, 752 (1915). Generally,
when the word "trustee" is used in corporate litigation, it is used merely as a convenient
abbreviation for describing a somewhat uncertain type of fiduciary, and not in its strictly
technical sense.
2'See 3 FLecHER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 838. Because directors are not technical
trustees even for the corporation, Shaw, v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 318, 28 Atl. 61g, 622 (1894),
they are permitted to profit personally in certain situations. See Stanton v. Schenck, 140Misc. 621. z.i N. Y. Suoa z2I 0I9.30.
O Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616 (U. S. 1874).
See Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder
(igio) 8 MIcn. L. REv. 267; Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock
(1918) 27 YALE L. J. 731; Smith, Purchase of Shares of Corporation. by a Director from a
Shareholder (1921) 19 MIcH. L. REv. 698; Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director
Purchasing Stock from His Stockholder (923) 32 YALE L. J. 637; Note (1925) 10 CORN.
L. Q. 5o9; Mariash, Fiduciary Relationship Between Director and Stockholder, N. Y. L. J.,
Feb. 20, 1933, at 1O22.
11 Shaw v. Davis, supra note 21; Niles v. N. Y. C. & D. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 144, 74
N. Y. Supp. 617 (I9O2), aff'd 176 N. Y. iig, 68 N. E. 142 (1903); Gamble v. Queens C. W.
Co., supra note 13.
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stroy the right of the owners of the property lawfully to control it
themselves. It would make a court of equity practically the guardian,
so to speak, of such a corporation and would substitute the Chancellor's
belief as to what contracts a corporation ought, as a matter of ex-
pediency, or policy, or business venture to make, instead of allowing
such questions to be settled by the persons beneficially interested in the
property." 25
At the other extreme is the suggestion that "all powers granted to a
corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within
the corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for
the ratable benefit of all shareholders as their interest appears [and] that,
in consequence, the use of the power is subject to equitable limitation when
the power has been exercised to the detriment of such interest, however
absolute the grant of power may be in terms, and however correct the tech-
nical exercise of it may have been." 26 These attempts to subordinate cor-
poration law into a mere phase of the law of trusts have, of course, not
gone unchallenged. One criticizes the trustee theory as being in deroga-
tion of the contract nature of corporate enterprises.2 7  Another on the
grounds of corporate efficiency and the lack of sufficient business knowledge
and experience on the part of courts.
2 8
The courts have chosen a middle-course, holding that majority stock-
holders who do in fact control occupy a fiduciary relation to the minority,
20
but that such trust relationship does not arise from the mere power to con-
trol by virtue of majority stock ownership.80 The distinction has been well
put in Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co.:
'-Shaw v. Davis, supra note 21, at 316, 318, 328, 28 Atl. at 621, 622, 625.
"Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Truest (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. lO49. See also
Berle, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control" (1926) 39 HAav. L. REv. 673. There is
current an extra-corporate "trust" notion which holds that business corporations have "a social
service as well as a profit-making function" and specifically have fiduciary obligations to
their employees, customers and to the general public. See Dodd, For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees? (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145. Cf. Berle, For Whom Corporate Mana-
gers are Trustees (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365.
rBook Review (1929) 38 YALE L. J. lOO3.
3 Book Review (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 714. Mr. Kline also suggests that "any move-
ment to increase the power of stockholders as such runs counter to the historical evolution
of corporations." Modem stockholders want dividends-not control!
"'Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co.. supra note 2; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. &
N. R. Co., 15o N. Y. 410, 430, 44 N. E. 1043, 1048 (1896) ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec.
Co., supra note 15, at 771; Kidd v. New Hampshire Traction Co., 74 N. H. I6o, 178, 66
Atl. 127, 136 (19O1). If the fact of control be there, the technique or manner of its exercise
is of no importance. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 492, 39 Sup. Ct. 533, 537
(1919). A minority may occupy the position of trustee if it in fact controls (for instance,
with the aid of proxies). Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529, 541 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1915).
: Wood, The Status of Management Stockholders (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 57. In
Wheeler v. Abilene Natl. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o8), the court
said, at 393-4: "The holder of the majority of the stock of a corporation has the power, by
the election of biddable directors and by the vote of his stock to do everything that the
corporation can do. His power to control and direct places him in its shoes, and constitutes
him the actual, if not the technical trustee for the holders of the minority of the stock." But
in that case the majority of the stock was owned by one person who was also a director
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"Authorities have been cited to support the proposition that an
individual or a corporation holding a majority of the capital stock of
another corporation sustains, by reason of such holding a fiduciary
relation to the minority stockholders. But these authorities only hold,
in effect, that the fiduciary relation arises when the majority stock-
holder assumes control of the corporation and dictates the action of the
directors. The majority stockholder is not made a trustee for the mi-
nority stockholders in any sense by the mere fact that he holds a ma-
jority of the stock, or by the further fact that he uses the voting power
of his stock to elect a board of directors for the corporation. The ma-
jority stockholder does not necessarily control the directors whom he
appoints, and, in fact, he has no right to control them, and if they are
controlled by him, they may be violating their duty, for which he also
may be liable. . . . No liability of the majority stockholder to the
minority stockholder for the misdeeds of his common trustees-the
directors-can arise from the mere fact that the majority stockholder
had the power to appoint, or, in fact, did appoint, these trustees. Such
liability, however, may arise if the majority stockholder has made the
derelict trustees his agents and dictated their conduct and thus caused
a breach of fiduciary duty." "'
Since courts of equity will concededly restrain fraudulent conduct on the
part of those in control of a corporation, the question of whether or not they
should be deemed trustees may seem at first impression inconsequential. The
answer to the question has, however, serious practical consequences. Cases
of so-called "actual fraud" are not frequent and when they do arise, they
are not difficult of solution. In close cases the decision may well depend
upon whether the court approaches the facts from the point of view that the
defendants are trustees for the plaintiffs. If it does, it will judge their
conduct by "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" instead of merely
by "the morals of the market place". 32 If the defendants b1e trustees the bur-
den of justifying their conduct is upon them. 3
Having made our obeisance to principles we can proceed with an exam-
ination of typical fact-situations which have confronted the courts in apply-
ing them.
and president of the corporation. See also Tefft v. Schaeffer, 148 Wash. 6o2, 269 Pac. lO48
(1928); Harrison v. Thomas, 112 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 5th, igoi); Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc.
578, 590, 30 N. Y. Supp. 86o, 868 (1894). The UNIFORm BUsiNESs CORPORATION AcT, 9 U.
L. A. (1932), approved by the American Bar Association in (1928) 53 A. B. A. R. 92, pro-
vides, in § 28 II, that holders of voting stock "stand in a fiduciary relation to the entire body
of shareholders" il there be non-voting stock.
2164 N. J. Eq. 673, 689-690, 53 Atl. 842, 848 (1903).
= "A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the unctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior", Cardozo, C. J.,iin Meinhard v..Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546
(1928). It has been asserted that courts do, and should, lag behind ethics. Swaine, supra
note 27.
'*Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (192I); Ross v.
Quinnesec Iron Mining Co., 227 Fed. 337 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla
Mining Co., supra note 29, at 540; Harrison v. Thomas, supra note 3o, at 29; Booth v. Land
Filling & Imp. Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 536, 59 Atl. 767 (1905); Sage v. Culver, 147 N. Y. 241,
247, 41 N. E. 513, 514 (I895). Cf. Wentz v. Scott, io F (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
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Dividends,35 salaries, etc.
Since the primary desire of stockholders is to receive dividends, it is
readily understandable why the resort to the courts to obtain them is so fre-
quent. At the same time it is in this field, which is essentially entirely one
of business policy, that the power of the directors comes closest to being
absolute.
The earliest cases took the view that the courts were powerless to inter-
fere,3 5 except, of course, in cases of fraud.3 6  Until this day the unwilling-
ness to interfere persists, 37 tempered by the view that equity should act where
there is a clearly "improper" refusal to declare dividends.3 8 One of the
earliest cases wherein a court compelled the declaration of a dividend is His-
cock v. Lacy.3 9
The corporation there involved was a national bank whose capital was
represented by 4,000 shares of which the defendant owned a majority and
the plaintiff 1,243. For years the bank had paid regular dividends of 8 to
io per cent. In 1887 some differences arose between the plaintiff and the
defendant and the plaintiff caused certain corporate action to be taken
which was highly disagreeable to the defendant. Chagrined, the defendant
quietly accumulated stock until in 1889 he owned a majority thereof and
proceeded to elect a board of directors of his own choosing, and to remove
the plaintiff entirely from the management of the bank. The directors whom
he elected were either relatives, nominees or the owners of an insignificant
See Wormser, May the Courts Compel the Declaration of a Corporate Dividend (1918)
3 So. L. Q. 281. For collection of cases, see ii FLETCHEP, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 5325-5327.
We shall here deal only with the rights of common stockholders. The holders of preferred
stock are on a somewhat different footing. See Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 28o U. S. 197,
50 Sup. Ct. io6 (1930) ; Cratty v. Peoria Law Lib. Ass'n, 219 Ill. 516, 76 N. E. 7o (19o6) ;
Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 93 Md. 475, 49 At. 327 (igoi) ; N. Y. L. E. & W. R.
R. v. Nickals, 119 U. S. 2g6, 7 Sup. Ct. 209 (1886) ; Boardman v. Lake Shore & M. So.
Ry., 84 N, Y. 157 (i8I); Storrow v. Texas Cons. Co. etc. Ass'n, 87 Fed. 612 (C. C. A.
5th, 1898); Hastings v. International Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N. Y. Supp. 815
(1919) ; Pardee v. Harwood Elec. Co., 262 Pa. 68, 1O5 AtI. 48 (1918). Berle, op. cit. supra
note 17, c. v. and vi; Berle, supra note 26, at io6o; Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 1374-1376.
As to rights of policy holderg in mutual life insurance companies, see Russell v. Washington
Life Ins. Co., 62 Misc. 403, 115 N. Y. Supp. 950 (1909).
5State v. Bank, 6 La. 745 (1834); Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y.
162, 192 (1883); McNab v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co., 62 Hun i, 16 N. Y. Supp. 448
(1891), aff'd 133 N. Y. 687, 31 N. E. 627 (1892).
'Anderson v. W. J. Dyer & Bros., 94 Minn. 30, IOI N. W. io6i (19o4) ; Burden v.
Burden, 159 N. Y. 287, 308, 54 N. E. 17, 23 (1899). Of course, in order to obtain dividends it
must appear that there is an available surplus. See Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 241 N. Y.
427, 15o N. E. 505 (1926) (involving the distribution of stock in another corporation as a
dividend). But the mere showing of a large available surplus is not, per se, sufficient to
move a court to intervene. Burden v. Burden, supra; Trimble v. Amer. Sugar Ref. Co.,
61 N. 3. Eq. 340, 48 Atl. 912 (igoi). Cf. Griffing v. A. A. Griffing Iron Co., 61 N. 3. Eq.
269, 48 AtI. 91o (igoi). As a condition precedent to relief from the courts the complaining
stockholder must also show that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation.
Wilson v. American Ice Co., 2o6 Fed. 736 (D. N. J. 1913).
= Marks v. American Brewing Co., 126 La. 666, 52 So. 983 (191o); Miller v. Crown
Perfumery Co., 125 App. Div. 881, I io N. Y. Supp. 8o6 (19o8) ; Hlawati v. Maeder-Hlawati
Co., 289 Pa. 233, 137 AtI. 235 (1927).
: Stevens v. U. S. Steel Corp., 68 N. J. Eq. 373, 377, 59 AtI. 905, 907 (195o).
Supra note 30.
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number of shares. In the aggregate the entire board exclusive of the defend-
ant, did not own more than 200 shares. They immediately adopted defend-
ant's announced policy not to declare dividends. The salaries of defendant's
friends were increased, so that the expenses of the bank were doubled. There
was no ready market for the stock and the defendant was unwilling either
to sell his stock or buy more. Admittedly, the bank was able to pay divi-
dends. It had a surplus equal to 50 per cent. of its capital, which was more
than it had been during the years when dividends were paid. Under these
circumstances the court found that the refusal to declare dividends was "with-
out reasonable cause and in bad faith for the purpose of punishing the mi-
nority interest" and that although the defendant was not guilty of "inten-
tional fraud" the plaintiff was entitled to redress. A dividend of not less
than 12 per cent. was ordered.
40
Probably the most famous dividend case is that which involved the Ford
Motor Company, before Henry Ford bought out the minority.41
The Ford Motor Company was organized in 1903 with an initial cap-
ital of $ioo,ooo, representing $49,000 in cash and $51,ooo in property.
Stock was issued to Henry Ford, the Dodge brothers, James Couzens and
several others. By 19o8, without further investment by the stockholders,
its capital stock was increased to $2,ooo,ooo. In addition to regular monthly
dividends of 5 per cent., the company paid special dividends which for the
years 1911-1915 aggregated $41,ooo,ooo. Despite these dividends, the cor-
porate surplus in 1916 was almost $I 12,000,000, of which almost $54,000,-
ooo was in cash. For the year ending July 31, 1916 the profits were almost
$6o,ooo,ooo. At this time Henry Ford owned 58 per cent. of the capital
stock of the company and controlled its policies. He announced that since
all the stockholders had received back in dividends more than they had in-
vested, no further special dividends would be paid but that all earnings,
above the regular dividend of 5 per cent. per month, would be put back
into the business for the purpose of extending the business and employing
more men at better wages. He also adhered to the policy of reducing the
sales price of the cars so that from an original price of $9oo, the sales price
in August 1916 was $360. In furtherance of Henry Ford's expansion pro-
gram, the company undertook the purchase of iron mines and ships, the
building of steel foundries and the now well-known River Rouge plant. No
special dividend having been paid since October 1915, the plaintiffs, owning
'For similar cases see Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 30 So. 926 (19o4) ;
Channon v. H. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (920) (motive for non-dividend policy in
family quarrel. Dividend ordered.). Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty
Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 309 (I93I), where the court refused to order a dividend, finding
justifiable business reasons for non-declaration notwithstanding family quarrel.
IDodge v. Ford Motor Co., 2o4 Mich. 459, 17o N. W. 668 (igi). Of course, this case
is hardly "typical" but, since the courts have generally declined to intervene except in special
circumstances, it seems preferable to consider in detail cases where the court did act rather
than the many where it did not.
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about io per cent. of the capital stock, protested and receiving no satisfac-
tion, brought suit to enjoin the expansion program and to compel the dis-
tribution of 75 per cent. of the cash surplus to stockholders. Mr. Ford's
testimony confirmed the view that he was being motivated in his policies by
"certain sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to Mr. Ford" or,
as the plaintiffs charged, he proposed to run the corporation as "a semi-
eleemosynary institution and not as a business institution". The trial court
enjoined the expansion program and decreed the declaration of a dividend
equal to 5o per cent. of the cash surplus. On appeal the injunction as to
the expansion program was reversed because "the experience of the Ford
Motor Company is evidence of capable management" and "judges are not
business experts" but the decree as to dividends was affirmed. In justifica-
tion, the court said:
"The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure
of corporate funds for the benefit of the employees, like the building
of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the bet-
terment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit
mankind at the expense of others, is obvious. . . . A business cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. . . . There is committed to the discretion of directors,
a discretion to be exercised in good faith, the infinite details of busi-
ness, including the wages which shall be paid to employees, the num-
ber of hours they shall work, the conditions under which labor shall
be carried on, and the prices for which products shall be offered to the
public. . . . It is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors
to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely inci-
dental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of bene-
fiting others." 42
It is most unusual to find corporate managers diverting funds to social
purposes rather than pay dividends, but it is not infrequent that corporate
funds are paid out as "salaries" rather than to minority stockholders as
dividends. Most of the cases involving salary questions turn on the self-
interest of the directors who voted them '3 but some go further.
In Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.,44 it appeared that a closely owned
corporation was paying to its directors and certain other employee-stock-
holders 9 per cent. on their capital stock in addition to dividends of 6 per
cent. received by all stockholders. At the suit of a minority stockholder
recovery of this 9 per cent. was had notwithstanding the fact that it had been
'"o04 Mich. at 506-507, 17o N. W. at 684. See Dodd, supra note 26; Note (ig) 3
A. L. R. 443. As to the right to sell products below cost see Matter of Pierson, 44 App.
Div. 215, 6o N. Y. Supp. 671 (i899) ; Trimble v. American Sugar Ref. Co., supra note 36.
See SpEmAm , op. cit. supra note 17. In Tefft v. Schaeffer, sapra note 3o, an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made to apply the rule against a director voting salary to himself to a
director voting salary to a majority stockholder when he, the director, owned only one share.
Cf. Harrison v. Thomas, supra note 30; Hiscock v. Lacy, supraZ note 30.
":212 N. Y. 121. io.5 N. E. 818 (I9g4).
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denominated by the directors as "additional salaries" and its payment ratified
by the defendants in their capacity of majority stockholders. 45
In Heublin v. Wight,4" the court undertook to pass in detail upon sal-
aries paid. It recognized the validity of the general principle that courts
would not review salary action taken by the majority however "unwise or
mistaken" they considered it but held it inapplicable to a case where the ma-
jority stockholders were the very ones to receive the salaries in question. The
court considered, among other things, the annual profits of the corporation,
the contributions of capital made by the stockholders and the returns re-
ceived by them thereon, the work done by the defendants and by other
employees, the salaries of other employees and prior salaries of the defend-
ants. The court fixed a salary for each of the defendants and on appeal 47
the decree was affirmed. In response to appellants' contention that even if
the salaries were excessive the court could only order their return and not
fix future salaries by "perpetual injunction", the court "assumed that the
decree is based on and has application only to existing conditions [and that]
if those conditions should undergo material change, so that large earnings
were realized under efficient and capable management, the payment of proper
and reasonable salaries though greater than the amounts fixed by the decree
would not be prohibited by the injunction now in force".
New stock issues, sale of unissued stock, etc.
The most general equitable limitation upon the power of directors to
issue new stock is found in the doctrine of pre-emptive rights.48  The ex-
ceptions which have been grafted on the doctrine and the radical differences
between the corporations of today with their complicated financial and vot-
ing set-ups and the corporations of 18o7 when the doctrine was first enun-
ciated 49 have induced a trend away from arbitrary rules towards the view
that the rights of stockholders should be measured by considerations of fair-
ness in each case rather than by dogma. In view of this tendency and the
prevalent practice of stipulating against pre-emptive rights in certificates of
incorporation, we shall here confine our discussion to a few cases that
passed on the facts involved from the point of view of equity rather than
the rules of pre-emptive rights.
0 See Scott v. Lorillard Co., io8 N. J. Eq. 153, 154 Atl. 515 (ig3i), aff'd log N. J. Eq.
417, 157 Atl. 388 (93).
0227 Fed. 667 (D. Md. 1915). See also Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. (2d) 531, 536-7
(D. Minn. 1924). In the further course of that litigation it was held that the defendants had
forfeited all right to compensation by acts in breach of trust. 23 F. (2d) 360-361 (D. Minn.
1927). Cf. Jacobson v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 184 N. Y. 152, 161-2, 76 N. E. 075, 1O78
(i9o6), where the court refused to give consideration to the prosperity of the corporation.
71238 Fed. .321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916).
" See Morawetz, Preemptive Right of Shareholders (1928) 42 HAzv. L. REv. 186; Frey,
Shareholders' Preemptive Rights (1929) 38 YA=E L. J. 563; Drinker, The Preemptive Right
of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 586; Berle, supra
note 26, at IO5O-Io6o.
" Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (18o7).
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In Luther v. C. J. Luther Co.,50 the board of directors voted to sell
thirty-nine shares of unissued original stock to the individual defendants,
who at the time controlled the board, in spite of the fact that a majority
of the outstanding stock was owned by the plaintiffs. The result of the sale
was to vest a majority of the authorized stock in the defendants. The
board determined, in the opinion of the trial court "honestly", that control
of the corporation in the plaintiffs would be dangerous to the corporation
and against its best business interests. The appellate court treated the stock
as "mere property over which the powers of the directors are the same as
over any other assets of the corporation" and therefore not subject to pre-
emptive rights, but held nevertheless that the sale, its purpose being to take
control from one faction and give it to another, was in breach of the duty
of the directors not "to dispose of or manage property of the corporation
to the end and for the purpose of giving to one part of their cestuis que trus-
tent a benefit and advantage over, or at the expense of, another part". The
stock was ordered returned to the corporation against repayment of the
sale price.
In a recent New York case 15 the court was guided by the same prin-
ciples but reached an opposite result because of the presence of other factors.
The corporation had seventy-six unissued shares and its board voted fifty
thereof to one Graham at par in payment of a debt due him and the remain-
ing twenty-six shares to one Ageno, a director, for cash, which it used to
pay another debt. No opportunity was given to any other stockholder to
subscribe. Graham thereafter transferred his shares to Ageno's sister, who
was also a director. As a result, Ageno's faction had control of the cor-
poration. The plaintiffs, minority stockholders, sued to compel return of
the stock and to restrain the voting thereof. The trial court found that the
issue was in good faith to satisfy debts rather than to shift control. In sup-
port of this conclusion it was noted that at the time of their issuance there
was no active contest for control, that the stock was sold for full value, and
that the twenty-six shares issued to Ageno did not carry control. On appeal
the Court of Appeals stated that even when no pre-emptive right exists "di-
rectors may not authorize the issue of unissued stock to themselves for the
primary purpose of converting them from minority to majority stockhold-
ers", but affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that, on the findings of the trial court, there was no "breach of trust" and
that minority stockholders may not in the absence thereof interfere in ques-
tions of business management.
0 11S Wis. i12, 94 N. W. 69 (19o3). See also Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 1s8, So N. E.
450 (I9O7). The court there suggests that where there is a contest for control the directors
should take advantage of the fact to get higher prices for unissued stock.
-'Dunlay v. Avenue M. Garage & R. Co., 253 N. Y. 274, I7o N. E. 917 (1930). Cf.
Essex v. Essex, 141 Mich. 200, 1o4 N. W. 622 (Igo).
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The directors of the International Silver Company, who owned pre-
ferred stock but no common stock, proposed to issue common stock at $50
a share to both preferred and common stockholders on the same basis. Be-
cause there were more shares of preferred than common then outstanding,
most of the new stock would go to the holders of preferred stock. By the
certificate of incorporation of the company, the preferred stock was entitled
on dissolution only to par and the common stock was entitled to the remain-
der. At the time of the proposed issuance the company had a large surplus.
On the application of common stockholders, the court held the result would
be unjust to the common stockholders and granted a preliminary injunction
restraining the issue.
52
The subsequent history of this stock issue is of interest. After the
granting of the preliminary injunction against the directors' original plan,
it having been contended by plaintiffs that the common stock was worth
very much more than $5o a share, the directors proposed to sell the stock
to the highest bidder. A preliminary injunction to restrain this was denied."3
The court took the view that the method proposed was proper to realize full
value for the shares (indicating, however, that the directors would not be
permitted to turn to their own advantage information not available to other
bidders) and that therefore it ought not to interfere with the board's discre-
tion as to method or even on the question whether there was any need for
selling the stock merely because the board's motives might be suspect.
Even under the broadest powers in the directors as to the consideration
for which they may issue stock, a court of equity will intervene where the
consideration fixed is unfair to existing stockholders.!4  Thus, there may
not be unfair discrimination between different classes of stockholders as to
the prices at which they may purchase the same kind of stock unless such
difference in price is justified by business reasons.55
"While an arbitrary sale of the same issue of stock at different
prices to different persons [even non-stockholders] would not be sanc-
tioned, such differential sales will be sustained if based on business and
commercial facts, which in the exercise of fair business judgment, lead
directors to follow such a course." 56
"'Borg v. International Silver Co.. 2 F. (2d) 91o (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
t'Borg v. International Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 143 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), aff'd ii F. (2d)
147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
'Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., i Del. Ch. 119, 132 Atl. 442 (1926), aff'd i5
Del. Ch. 420, 14o Atl. 264 (1927); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F. (2d) 781
(C. C. A..d. 1926), rev'.g .oo Fed. 590 (D. Del. 1924).
'Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., supra note 54. The court refused to interfere
with the action of the board, finding that the financial justification offered by the directors
for selling stock to different classes of existing stockholders at different prices was not
"unwarranted and unfair", and that the directors acted "for what they believed to be the
advantage of the corporation and all its stockholders."
' Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, supra note 54, at 788. Here too the action of the
board was not disturbed.
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The result of the foregoing cases seems to be that, in addition to the
limitations imposed by the doctrine of pre-emptive right, directors may not
exercise their power to issue new stock or sell treasury stock
(a) for the purpose of shifting control of the corporation; but courts
will not intervene where the change of control is merely an inci-
dental result of the issue which was made in good faith for busi-
ness reasons;
(b) except at fair prices;
(c) so as to modify unfairly the existing relative rights of different
classes of stockholders in the corporate property;
(d) at different prices to different persons unless justified by busi-
ness reasons.
Purchase of stock; its own and that of other corporations.
The first problem in connection with the right of a corporation to pur-
chase its own stock is one of power, but with that we are not here con-
cerned. 7  Assuming the existence of the power, what are the limitations
upon its exercise? 0s The cases involving solvent corporations and there-
fore excluding questions of creditors' rights and of the right to purchase
except out of surplus are few.5 Where fraud appears, the purchase will be
enjoined.60 On the other hand, where the action is taken in good faith to
aid the corporation, the purchase will be sustained.' Apparently there is
no need to permit all stockholders to sell merely because the privilege is given
G"See Wormser, The Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its Own Stock (1915) 24 YALE
L. J. 177. Cases are collected in 5 THomPSON, CoRpoRATiONs (3d ed. 1927) §§ 4081-2.
"See Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock (193o) 15 MINN. L. R. i,
for a discussion of this question from the standpoint of creditors as well as of dissenting
stockholders. Mr. Levy concludes that the legitimate objects of re-purchase can. be
achieved in other ways, that the power is subject to abuse, that the resort to equity is an
inadequate remedy, and that. therefore, the power should be denied by statute. The present
writer does not concur in this ultimate conclusion. The New York Stock Exchange requires
that listed investment trusts do not purchase their own common stocks except "under
exceptional and special circumstances". The primary object appears to be the prevention of
trading in the companies own stock. "The employment of corporate funds to speculate in
the stock of the company to which the funds belong is not a practice to be encouraged."
Coleman v. Columbia Oil Co., 51 Pa. 74 (1865).
0 For discussions of the rights of stockholders among themselves when the purchase
is not out of surplus, see Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 253 Fed. 66 (S. D.
N. Y. 1918) ; Barrett v. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 3o2, 175 N. E. 765 (1931). Pur-
chases except out of surplus are in some jurisdictions expressly prohibited. See N. Y.
PENAL LAw (igog) § 664.
e' Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., 7o Fed. 646 (C. C. D. Minn. 1895). This is so even if
the action be taken under the guise of capital reduction proceedings. Theis v. Durr, 125 Wis.
651, IO4 N. W. 985 (1905).
c1Ruffner v. Sophie Mae Candy Corp., 35 La. App. 114, 132 S. E. 396 (1926); Copper
Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, ii Ariz. 334, 95 Pac. 94 (i9o8) ; Gilchrist v. Highfield, 14o Wis.
476, I2.3 N. W. 02 (i9og)
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to one.6 2 But funds properly ascribable to one class of stock, e. g., accrued
dividends, may not be used to retire stock of another class.03
The terminology of the opinions in cases involving the purchase of
stock of other corporations is such that any attempt to segregate rigidly the
problem of power from that of the abuse thereof is difficult. The courts
seem to say that when the object or purpose of the purchase is proper the
corporation has the power to make it but that when the end is improper
the purchase is ultra. vires. It would perhaps be simpler, and certainly more
consistent with present day charters and practice, to recognize freely that
corporations have the power to purchase stock in other corporations, but
that its exercise will be restrained if abused to the injury of one entitled to
complain. A traditional standard for judging the propriety of a stock pur-
chase was whether or not it would aid the authorized business of the corpo-
ration, but.with the present-day use of multi-power clauses in charters and
the interdependence of business its sufficiency is rapidly passing.
64 An older
case which discussed the subject in terms of ultra vires but which actually
applied equitable criteria to a stock purchase is Robotham v. Prudential In-
surance Company.65 The insurance company was authorized to purchase
stock in other corporations for "investment". The directors sought to pur-
chase a majority of the stock of a trust company under an arrangement
whereby the trust company would simultaneously acquire stock control of
the insurance company. The result would be that the board of the insurance
company, by virtue of their power to vote the trust company's stock, would
become self-perpetuating. The court found that the "control" feature rather
than the "investment" element was uppermost in the minds of the directors
and, at the suit of a minority stockholder of the insurance company, enjoined
the purchase.66  While the court referred to the high price being paid for
the stock and its low yield, it is reasonable to assume that if the "control"
scheme were absent the court would have refused to interfere with the action
of the board in the exercise of its business judgment. This is exactly what
a cburt of the same state did in the case of one corporation purchasing the
stock of a competing company.
6 7
6'Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Telephone Co., 127 Iowa 350, IOI N. W. 742 (19o4). See
also Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 (1873) ; Barrett v. W. A. Webster Co.,
supra note .5Q. This of course assumes the absence of "fraud". See Lowe v. Pioneer Thresh-
ing Co., supra note 6o; also cases cited i4a C. J. 280, note 91. Cf. General Investment Co.
v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Ati. 244 (1925), to the effect that a
corporation buying stock for retirement must purchase ratably from all stockholders. Shares
of stock are not retired by mere purchase. 5 TiaoMPsoiN, CoPolATIoNs (3d ed. 1927) § 4084.
Capital reductions must be effected ratably between all stockholders. See Note (1926) 44
A. L. R. 35.
General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., supra note 62.
For collection of cases on power of corporations to purchase and hold, stock, see 5
THoMPsON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 4063-4077.
6 Supra note 31.
,"To like effect, Anglo-American Land M. & N. Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721 (C. C. A.
8th, 1904).
07 Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Rys. etc. Co., mtpra note 12. But it was later charged
by another minority stockholder that the Ellerman suit was collusive. The charge was
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Amendment of by-laws.
A court will, of course, refuse to interfere with the adoption by the
majority of a by-law dealing with ordinary administrative or business mat-
ters.0 8 On the other hand, where it is clear that action under the proposed
by-law would necessarily be improper a court may enjoin its adoption. Thus
stockholders were enjoined from voting upon an amendment to the by-laws
of the corporation so as to provide for 6xtra dividends to stockholders who
were also employees, notwithstanding the assertion that the proposed plan
was merely one fixing extra compensation to employees. 69
An early leading case laid down the principle that "vested rights" may
not be taken from minority stockholders without their consent by by-law
amendments.' 0  In that case the capitalization of the corporation was fixed
by the by-laws which provided for their amendment by the majority of the
stockholders. Originally there was only one class of stock and the court
held 71 that a second class, preferred as to dividends, could not be created,
even though offered to all stockholders upon the same terms, without unani-
mous consent.
72
Amendment of Charters.71
We shall here not consider involuntary amendments imposed upon the
corporation by the legislature 74 but only those voluntarily adopted by the
majority 75 and shall assume that the power of amendment has been ex-
pressly reserved.7 6 Under such circumstances the only limitation which
seems to have as yet received judicial sanction is that "vested riglits" may
not be destroyed. A claim to accumulated dividends is such a "vested
not sustained. Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Ry. Co., 5o N. J. Eq. 656, 669-676, 25
Atl. 277, 282-284 (1892).
" Burden v. Burden, supra note 36 (by-law giving extensive powers to gen-
eral manager).
" Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., supra note 45. Cf. Rogers v. Hill, 6o F. (2d) lO9 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932), sustaining a by-law granting to officers a percentage of net profit. But see dis-
senting oninion of Mr. Justice Stone in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 295 (1933).
70 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879).
7 1By way of dicta; the decision was against the plaintiffs because of their laches, acquies-
cence, etc.
= The ruling was overcome by legislation permitting the creation of preferred stock by
a two-thirds vote of stockholders. See Dresser v. Donner Steel Co., 247 N. Y. 553, 556-7,
161 N. E. 179, 18o (1928). The subject is now considered in connection with the amend-
ment of charters rather than of by-laws, infra.
" See Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927)
75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 585, 723; Cades, Constitutional and Equitable Limitation on the Power
of the Majority to Amend Charters (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 256.
"' The writer has in course of preparation an article on state control over corporations.
Throughout this article we use the word "majority" to signify the percentage sufficient
under the governing law to adopt a course of conduct, it may be 5I%, 67% or 75%.
"' Nor shall we treat the right of a dissenting minority to compel the corporation to
buy their stock at appraised values under statutes. See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Share-
holders to Appraisal and Payment (193o) 15 CORN. L. Q. 420; Robinson, Dissenting Share-
holders: Their Rights to Divideids and the Valuation of Their Shares (1932) 32 CoL. L.
REv. 6o; infra note 85.
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right" that may not be wiped out by charter amendment. 77  But a change
in future dividend rights is not invalid.78 Thus in Davis v. Louisville Gas
& Electric Co.79 the court refused to interfere with the adoption of an amend-
ment altering the dividend rights of the Class B stock and depriving it of
other "material rights", and justified its position by accepting the view of
the majority, acting in "good faith", that the best interests of the corpora-
tion required added benefits for the Class A stock.
Sale,80 Consolidation,"' Reorganization 82 and Dissolution."8
While the various matters indicated by this sub-heading may be sepa-
rate and distinct from each other, in practice most corporate transactions
of the kind which will be here considered involve more than one. Much
has already been written on this subject.8 4 Much of the discussion is,
however, concerned with the existence of adequate power in the majority
and its compliance with statutory and charter provisions. We here, as
throughout this article, assume the most sweeping statutory and charter pro-
visions and technical compliance with all their terms. The question of the
'7 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (923) ; Lons-
dale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 5o
(1927). See also Colgate v. U. (S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atl. 657 (19o7), rev'g
75 N. J. Eq. 227, 72 Atl. 126 (igog). Cf. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., infra note go.
Quaere, whether the benefit of a sinking fund requirement is such a vested right. In Yoakum
v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 199), an amendment depriv-
ing a preferred stock of its sinking fund rights was held invalid, but it is not clear that the
same result would have been reached if the court had held applicable a subsequently adopted
statutory provision couched in broader terms.
7 Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (1928) ; Peters
v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. i1, 114 Atl. 598 (i92i). Nor is a change in "cumu-
lative voting" provisions. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 147 Atl. 255 (Del. Ch. I929). And
a change from par value to no par value stock is also valid. Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 2o6
Ala. 254, 89 So. 790 (192).
'Supra note 7& The decision has been criticized. See Cades, supra note 73.
8o Meaning a voluntary sale of all or substantially all the assets of the corporation. The
power to sell without unanimous consent will be assumed. See Warren, Voluntary Trans-
fers of Corporate Undertakings (1917) 3o HAgv. L. REV. 335.
Including "merger".
The major problems in reorganizations arise out of the different rights of holders of
different classes of securities and but rarely out of conflicts between security-holders of the
same class. This is because the corporation is generally insolvent and the problem is to
adjust the relative priorities. See Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations, lecture
delivered March 1916 and published in-SoME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, RE-
ORGANIZATION AND REGuLATIoN (1917) 135; Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Cer-
tain, Developments of the Last Decade (I927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 901. See Abbot v. Waltham
Watch Co., 26o Mass. 8I, 156 N. E. 8 7 (1927). The writer has in course of preparation
an article on creditor control of corporations.
See Fain, Limitations of the Statutory Power of Majority Stockholders to Dissolve
a Corporation (1912) 25 I-ARv. L. REv. 677. The right of the minority to compel dissolution
will be considered hereafter in connection with the question of the form of relief which may
be obtained in equity.
" In addition to the articles cited supra notes 76-83 see Lattin, Equitable Limitations on
Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 645;
Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intracorporate Conflict (1932) 17 IOwA L. BULL. 313;
Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares (1931)
19 CALnF. L. REv. 349; Berle, supra note 26, at IO69-IO72. There is a somewhat unique proce-
dure in Pennsylvania. See Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 42 (1858), and the
cases which have followed it and, as to preferred stock, Petry v. Harwood Electric Co.,
28o Pa. 142 124 Atl. 302 (924).
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minority's right to redress in equity is also tied up with its rights under
statutory provisions affording a right to compel the corporation to buy its
stock at appraised value, 5 but since those rights, except in a very few
states by virtue of express provision in their statutes, are not deemed ex-
clusive, and since the statutory right is not yet universal, it seems desirable
to examine a few typical cases in equity not influenced thereby. Even if
appraisal statutes come to preenpt the field, these cases should be helpful
in formulating general concepts as to equitable limitations upon majorities.
Tke majority having the power to sell all the corporate assets the courts
will not review the "expediency" of such a sale but will intervene only to
prevent or redress fraud."" A sale at less than fair value is fraudulent.8 T
The Steel & Tube case 8 is most instructive because of the detailed
review of the testimony contained in the opinions. The plaintiffs, owning
about 2o per cent. of the common stock of Steel & Tube Co., sued to enjoin
a proposed sale of all its assets to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. for about
$73,000,000. Control of the corporation was vested in a syndicate which
owned about 6o per cent. of the common stock and some preferred stock.
Prominent in the syndicate was a banking firm which had previously dis-
tributed an issue of its preferred stock at $98 a share. Under the terms
of the proposed sale the preferred stock would be redeemed at $i io a share.
The plaintiffs charged that the syndicate had a selfish interest in putting
through the sale in that it was their desire to liquidate their common stock
holdings quickly and that the retirement of the preferred at $iio would
greatly enhance the bankers' good will. The court did not consider this
interest sufficient to vitiate their approval of the sale, but nevertheless granted
a preliminary injunction on a showing that the book value of the assets
was over $94,oooooo. Thereupon a hearing was had as to the adequacy
of the price and on all the evidence the court dissolved the injunction be-
'See Wiener, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders (1927) 27 CoT. L. RZv. 547; Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv.
233; articles cited supra note 76. For developments during 1931 see Note (1932) 45 HAv.
L. REv. 13g6-1403.
I J. H. Lane Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915) ; on rehearing
sale set aside because the directors were the purchasers, 232 Fed. 421 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916).
' Hinds v. Fishkill & Matteawan Gas Co., 96 App. Div. 14, 88 N. Y. Supp. 954 (1904).
See Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bk. Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o8). Relief was
granted in Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., supra note 33; Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v.
Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). Relief was denied in Allaun v. Consolidated
Oil Co., 147 Atl. 257 (Del. Ch. 1929); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14
Del. Ch. I, 64, 12o Atl. 486, 122 Atl. 142 (1923) ; Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 216
Fed. 242 (D. Mont. 1914), aff'd sub nom. Wall v. Parrot S. & C. Co., 244 U. S. 407, 37 Sup.
Ct. 6og (1917). The result is frequently influenced by the court's determination as to where
the burden of proof lies. While there is some conflict in the decisions, it is safe to assume that
when the sale is to the majority itself or to those affiliated with it, the burden of justification
will be on the defendants, Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., supra, but that whenever the board
is independent, and without a personal interest in the transaction, there is a presumption of
fairness which the plaintiffs must overcome. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube
Co., supra" Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., supra.
' Supra note 87.
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cause it was not satisfied that the discrepancy between the value of the assets
and the sales price was so great "that it is to be attributed not to a differ-
ence of opinion upon a highly debatable question but rather to bad faith".
Merger terms too must be "fair".
The Equitable Life Assurance Society owned about 67 per cent. of
the stock of the Equitable Trust Company and 49 per cent. of that of the
Mercantile Trust Company, and proposed a merger of the two. Under the
proposed terms, the new stock would be issued in the ratio of one for one of
the old Mercantile stock and one for two of the old Equitable stock or $435
in cash per share. It appeared that the book value of Mercantile was $452
a share and that of the Equitable $44o. The court nevertheless refused to
intervene at the suit of a minority stockholder of the Equitable and justified
the difference in treatment of the two stocks by comparing the business situa-
tion of the two trust companies, the Mercantile earning 51 per cent. on each
share and the Equitable only 25 per cent. It also heeded pessimistic fore-
casts as to the future prospects of the Equitable. 9
A preferred stockholder of Central Leather Company attacked the
merger between that company and U. S. Leather Company on the ground
that it was inequitable. For each share of preferred stock entitled to accu-
mulated dividends of $43 and 7 per cent. annual dividends ahead of the
common, there was to be given $5 in cash, one-half share of a new preferred
stock entitled to dividends at the rate of $3.50 per annum, and three-fourths
share of a Class A stock having priority over the common stock in dividends
to the extent of $3 per annum. The court held the terms not inequitable
in view of the financial conditions of the two companies.90
In Outwater v. Public Service Corp.,9' the court did enjoin a proposed
merger. The plaintiffs were minority stockholders in operating utilities
whose properties were leased to a corporation which (through a subsidiary)
owned the majority stock of the corporations. The leases were for 999
years at net rentals which assured dividends to the stockholders. The pur-
pose of the proposed merger was to change the leaseholds into fees. The
stockholders of each of the corporations were to receive for their common
stock a 6 per cent. cumulative preferred non-voting stock on a basis that
would afford them a slightly better yield than their common stock under
the leases. The preferred stock was to be redeemable after three years.
Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 15. Some of the facts appear in Morse v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 124 App. Div. 235, io8 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1908). The court
was unmistakably influenced by the fact that only i% of the Equitable stock was opposing the
merger.
I Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 543, 138 Atl. 772 (i927), aff'd lO7
N. J. Eq. q28, 153 Atl. 402 (193). Cf. Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co. and cases cited supra
note 77. In MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 157 Atl. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928),
a preferred stockholder unsuccessfully challenged a merger on the ground that the common
stock was receiving an undue proportion of the consideration being received for the entire
corporation.
" lO3 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (1928), aff'd lO4 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 At. 916 (I929).
CORPORATE CONTROL BY MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS
There was no "actual intent to defraud the minority". The court ac-
cepted as "an abstract proposition" that a court of equity has no right "to
interfere in the internal affairs of the merging companies in the absence of
fraud, actual or constructive", but was induced to grant the injunction pri-
marily because of the redemption feature. This, in the view of the court,
resulted in a compulsory sale of their common stock by the minority for
the equivalent of a three year promissory note and was violative of the
principle that "continued membership, until dissolution, is an inherent prop-
erty right in corporate existence".
In another case 02 a consolidation was held "unfair" and therefore a
"legal fraud". The consolidation was between the Missouri-Edison Com-
pany and the Union Electric Company, both of which were controlled by
the same interests. The attack on the consolidation was by a preferred
stockholder of Missouri-Edison. The finding that the terms of consolida-
tion were not fair to the plaintiff was the result of an analysis of the figures
which disclosed that whereas the Union company contributed only 6/32nds
of the combined assets, it received securities representing four-fifths thereof,
and that although the Edison preferred stock was entitled to a prior claim
on one-half of the combined assets, it received only 5!32nds.
The need for equality implicit in the Missouri-Edison case was some
years later made explicit by the United States Supreme Court in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Bogert.93 It there appeared that the Southern Pacific sought
to incorporate into its own system the Houston & Texas Central Railway,
control of which it owned through a subsidiary, upon terms which would per-
mit it to acquire the new stock to be issued for the property at $26 a share,
whereas others, including the minority stockholders, would be required to
pay over $71 a share for the same stock. The court said:
"If through that control a sale of the corporation's property is
made and the property acquired by the majority, the minority may not
be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale. .
The essential of the liability to account sought to be enforced in this
suit lies not in fraud or mismanagement, but in the fact that, having
become a fiduciary through taking control of the old Houston Com-
pany, the Southern Pacific has secured fruits which it has not shared
with the minority. The wrong lay not in acquiring the stock, but in
refusing to make a pro rata distribution on equal terms among the old
Houston Company shareholders." "
The right to continue in the corporation suggested in the Outwater case
may be sufficient to prevent dissolution by the majority. The statutory power
to dissolve given to the majority may not be used to "freeze out" the mi-
-Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., supra note I.
"Supra note 29.
" Id. at 492, 34 Sup. Ct. at 537.
712 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
nority. Thus, in Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.,95 an action for an
accounting was sustained, the court finding that the action of the majority
in discontinuing the business and liquidating it was in bad faith to enable a
new corporation which they organized to acquire it. The "fiduciary" theory
which underlies the limitation upon the majority's right to dissolve in "bad
faith" was expressed by the New York Court of Appeals as follows:
"The directors, in reaching their belief [as to whether the dis-
solution is 'advisable'] cannot consider or give weight to their personal
wishes, comfort or advantage. Whether or not the dissolution- is wise
or expedient for themselves as apart from the corporation or any or
all of the other stockholders they can neither question nor determine.
Their action must be based upon the belief that the interests and wel-
fare of the corporation and the stockholders generally will be promoted
by the dissolution. The belief may be erroneous or ill-founded, but it
must be formed in good faith. . . . The relation of the directors
to the stockholders is essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust.
. . . Undoubtedly no trust relation ordinarily exists between the
stockholders themselves or between the stockholders and the corpora-
tion, because the stockholders, ordinarily, are strangers to the manage-
ment and control of the corporation business and affairs. . . . The
section 221 [General Corporation Law] imposes upon the stockholders
the ultimate determination of the important question whether or not
the corporation shall be dissolved forthwith. The stockholders are
bound to determine and control this particular part of the corporation's
affairs, in regard to which they occupy a relation of trust as between
themselves and the corporation, and are burdened and restricted by
fiduciary obligations. When a number of stockholders constitute them-
selves, or are by law constituted, the managers of corporate affairs or
interests they stand in much the same attitude towards the other or
minority stockholders that the directors sustain, generally, towards
all the stockholders, and the law requires of them the utmost good
faith. . . . In taking corporate action under the statute, the stock-
holders are acting for the corporation and for each other and they can-
not use their corporate power in bad faith or for their individual ad-
vantage or purpose." 96
A contrary conclusion had been reached some seventeen years earlier
by a federal court sitting in New Jersey." In that case the defendant corpo-
9 Supra note 44. See also Paine v. Saulsbury, 20 Mich. 58, 166 N. W. 1036 (I918),
where the court refused a judicial dissolution at the request of the majority because the
corporation was prosperous and the primary object of the dissolution was to get rid of the
minority. Cf. Slattery v. Greater New Orleans Realty & Dev. Co., 128 La. 871, 55 So. 558
(1911).
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 26 N. Y. I85, 192, 194, 195, 123 N. E. 148,
151, 152 (1919).
Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & Distributing Co., 114 Fed. 491 (C. C. D. N. J.
i902). Cf. Allen v. Distilling Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 531, ioo Atl. 62o (1917), aff'd sub nor. U. S.
Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Distilling Co., 89 N. J. Eq. 177, 104 Atl. 216 (1918). See also In re
Pneumatic Tube Steam Splicer Co., 6o F. (2d) 524 (D. Md. 1932), sustaining right of
directors, who also are majority stockholders, to file voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
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ration owned a majority of the common stock of another corporation and
had guaranteed the dividends on its preferred stock. The court refused to
enjoin the dissolution of said corporation, at the suit of a preferred stock-
holder who claimed that the purpose of the dissolution was to avoid the
guaranty, holding that stockholders are in no sense trustees for each other
and are not to be barred from voting because of a personal interest in the
matter.
In a still earlier case "8 the court also held that it may not inquire into
the "motives" which actuated the majority in its desire to dissolve the cor-
poration, but held it liable to the minority for the fair value of the assets, the
majority itself having acquired them. 9
Were it not for the fact that in discussions as to the adequacy of equity
to protect minorities the substantive principles are inextricably tied up with
what may be briefly described as procedural questions, we might stop at
this point for summation. Under the circumstances, however, to do so would
be to tell but half the tale.
II
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Those who challenge the adequacy of the judicial relief available to
minority stockholders do so primarily on the grounds of delay, expense, and
"pitfalls". 100  Occasionally it is urged that judges are incompetent to deal
with business problems.
Minority stockholders' suits are not the exclusive exemplars of the law's
delays and hence it is not a special problem.' 01 Nor is judicial incompe-
tence manifested only in corporate litigation. If the contention is that not
even competent judges are able to deal with "business" problems, it is point-
less. Courts must, as they are continuously doing, deal with business prob-
lems and the fact that corporate machinery may be involved does not alter
the situation. The element of expense is undeniably serious for the small
c'Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884), appeal dis-
missed 136 U. S. 645, 1o Sup. Ct. 1072 (1889).
The property was acquired for $2,300,ooo but the court fixed its value at $5,500,000,
refusing to accept a mere liquidating value, but seeking instead its value as a going concern
at the time of dissolution. Cf. Green v. Blunett, 11o S. W. ioS (Texas, i9o8) ; and Watkins v.
National Bank, 51 Kan. 254, 32 Pac. 914 (1893), where the court refused to hold the defend-
ants liable for "good will".
'-~ "It is all very well to say that the minority stockholder has his redress if his company
is being managed in an adverse interest. He hasn't. . . . Litigating against one of these
powerful systems is an expensive business. The pitfalls and delays are endless. It is a
luxury reserved for the large holders and then only when they have plenty of money and
infinite patience." Samuel Untermyer, Some Needed Legislative Reforms in Corporate
Management, an address, New York County Lawyers' Assn., Jan. 5, 1911. Professor
Wormser is satisfied "that our courts have shown an intelligent realization of the implied
obligations of corporate entities and their managers". Book Review (1933) 1g A. B. A. J.
113.
10 Indeed, in many cases, as we shall hereafter see, preliminary and summary relief is
obtainable pendente lite.
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stockholder acting alone but, generally, he need not act alone and may read-
ily join with other stockholders in the same position.10 2  The advantage
which the management has in its ready access to all information, in its busi-
ness contacts, and in the availability of the corporate treasury cannot be gain-
said.1
0 3
The "pitfalls" presumably are to be found in the rules of practice and
procedure,' 0  but before considering them it seems desirable to express a
caution. A stockholder's suit is but a single step in what has been aptly
described as a "campaign". It begins with the first efforts to obtain infor-
mation from the corporation and very frequently ends, not with victory
or defeat in the courtroom, but in a negotiated compromise. It is for this
reason that the law reports do not give a full and complete picture of the
struggle between majorities and minorities.
The nature of the suit.
Suits brought by individual stockholders are more or less indiscrimi-
nately referred to as representative, or as derivative, or merely as stockhold-
ers' suits. It would seem that they can be classified into three categories.
There is the purely personal cause of action for the violation of a private
right. In this category are suits to compel the transfer of stock,10 5 to en-
force recognition of pre-emptive rights, 0 6 or to recover damages for breach
of a contract in favor of the stockholder. 107  The remaining two categories
involve the enforcement of corporate rights. One group consists of those
cases where the suit is against a third person to recover a benefit for the cor-
poration which it has itself refused to seek.'0 8 In these "derivative" suits
the corporation is a nominal defendant, sued because of its unwillingness
to act as plaintiff, but the direct beneficiary of a victory by the plaintiff.' 0 9
The last group consists of those strictly intra-corporate suits where the plain-
tiff brings a "representative" suit on his own behalf and on behalf of all
other stockholders similarly situated.
This attempt at cataloging is suggested merely as a convenient device
for handling most situations and is not intended to indicate that all stockhold-
See Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 8o U. oF PA. L. Rtv. 670.
a To some extent these advantages are balanced by the relative ease with which a minor-
ity stockholder with a plausible cause of action may force the maintenance of the status quo
pendente lite when the management may desire immediate action.
' ' In this section we shall of course assume familiarity with equity pleading and prac-
tice and shall discuss only a few special problems.
"SE. g., Knox v. Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259, iog N. E. 25o (1915).
" E. g., Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. io9o (19o6).
I E. g., Refusal to convert convertible stock: Marony v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry.
Co., 33 F. (2d) 916 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) ; Cheatham v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 37 F.
(2d) 593 (S. D. N. Y. 193o).
' E. g., Barr v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., supra note 18. See Glenn, The Stock-
holder's Suit (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 58o.
"' At times the forces that caused the corporation to decline to sue may cause it actively,
either openly or surreptitiously, to espouse the cause of the defendants. This is invariably true
when the "third-party "defendants are the controlling directors.
CORPORATE CONTROL BY MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS
ers' suits qan be arbitrarily placed in one group or another exclusively. In
litigation there is inevitable overlapping. A single stockholder's personal
suit may determine a whole course of corporate conduct. So too the issues
involved in a strictly intra-corporate conflict over policy may be presented
to the courts in the form of a suit for an accounting against officers or direc-
tors and thus take on the procedural ear-marks of a case of the second group.
Nor is it always possible to determine with exactness whether the right being
asserted is a corporate or a personal right. A series of New York cases
that have been the subject of much discussion 110 may be used to delineate
the problem that sometimes exists.
In Niles v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company,111
the plaintiff, a stockholder of the New York & Northern Railroad Company,
sued to recover damages sustained by him as the result of an alleged con-
spiracy on the part of the defendants to procure the property of the New
York & Northern for the New York Central & Hudson River. A demurrer
to the complaint was sustained. The Court of Appeals took the position
that the injury resulting from the wrongs of the defendants was to the
corporation and that the depreciation in the value of plaintiff's stock was
an incidental result of the injury sustained by the corporation. The court
was influenced in denying direct relief to the plaintiff by the fact that cor-
porate creditors had prior rights and that the recognition of plaintiff's cause
would have given a similar cause of action to every stockholder. This deci-
sion was followed without much difficulty until General Rubber Co. v. Bene-
dict.11-2 The General Rubber Company (of New Jersey) owned practically
all of the capital stock of the General Rubber Company of Brazil. Benedict
was a director of the plaintiff but not of the subsidiary company. The com-
plaint charged that Benedict in violation of the obligations which he owed
the plaintiff as one of its directors concealed from it the fact that an employee
of the subsidiary company was misapplying that company's funds. The
plaintiff asked damages for the amount by which the value of its shares of
the subsidiary company was lessened as a result of the defalcations. The
Appellate Division sustained the complaint by a 3-2 decision. On a further
appeal to the Court of Appeals the complaint was again sustained; this time
by a 4-2 decision. The minority argued that the direct injury was to the
subsidiary corporation and that the plaintiff as a stockholder had no right
to sue for its indirect damage. The majority apparently distinguished the
earlier cases by emphasizing that the obligation of the defendant to the plain-
tiff was by virtue of his position as director but that any liability of his to
O 'Note (1915) 28 HAR. L. REv. 409; (1916) 25 YALE L. J. 154; (1923) 23 COL L. REv.
498; (1929) 4:2 H. v. L. REV. 7o5; Comment (1929) 38 YAIx L. J. 965.
3:,76 N. Y. i19, 68 N. E. 142 (19o3). See also Major v. American Malt & Grain Co.,
i1o Misc. 132, 181 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1920). Cf. Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney,
supra note 87.
= 215 N. Y. 18, iog N. E. 96 (I915), aff'g 164 App. Div. 332, 149 N. Y. Supp. 88o (1914).
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the subsidiary corporation would exist, if at all, on an entirely different
basis. In support of this distinction some reliance was placed upon Ritchie
v. McMullen." 3  In that case, one Ritchie, who had pledged corporate
stocks and bonds with certain persons as collateral for a loan, alleged that
they conspired to render his property valueless and in furtherance of that
conspiracy mismanaged the corporation whose securities he had pledged.
The court, per Taft, J., held the principle that a stockholder cannot obtain
direct relief for injuries to the corporation inapplicable to the situation there
presented because the wrongdoers owed Ritchie the direct duties of pledgees.
These decisions induced the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to sustain a
complaint whereby an inventor sought to recover damages for alleged im-
proper conduct on the part of the defendants with respect to a corporation
to which the inventions had been assigned.1
1 4
On the authority of the General Rubber Company case, the New York
Court of Appeals some years later sustained a claim against an administrator
and his surety for loss sustained as a result of his peculations from a cor-
poration in which the estate owned stock and in which he acted as officer
and director, notwithstanding the fact that the corporation had itself recov-
ered a judgment against him for the same misappropriation.' 5 The deci-
sion was not rendered without a powerful dissent which contended that
decisions such as in the General Rubber and Ritchie cases can be regarded
as sound only when the duty owing to the plaintiff is entirely different from
that owing to the corporation and when the plaintiff's loss is not merely an
indirect result of the injury to the corporation." 6
If the wrong sought to be redressed be found to be a corporate injury
certain consequences follow. The complaining stockholder may not sue for
his own benefit but must sue for the benefit of the corporation. 117  It is not
sufficient to sue merely on behalf of such stockholders as may join,"l8 for
the right is that of the corporation and not merely the joint right of the com-
plaining stockholders." 9  The judgment accordingly must be in favor of
the corporation and not in favor of the plaintiffs. 120  Under exceptional
circumstances the plaintiffs may receive directly their proportionate interest
in any recovery which would ordinarily go to the corporation.
12'
"79 Fed. .522 (C. C. A. 6th, i8g7).
Vierling v. Baxter, 293 Pa. 52, 141 Atl. 728 (1928).
'9 Matter of Auditore, ;249 N. Y. 335, 164 N. E. 242 (1928).
I See Green v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cer-
tiorari denied z'8 U. S. 6o2, 49 Sup. Ct. 9 (1928).
9 Davis v. Peabody, 170 Mass. 397, 49 N. E. 75o (1898).
"'Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St. 341, 62 N. E. 327 (1901).
u Endicott v. Marvel, 81 N. J. Eq. 378, 388, 87 Atl. 23o, 234 (1913), aff'd 83 N. 3. Eq.
632, 92 Atl. 373 (1914).
' Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., 167 App. Div. 669, 152 N. Y. Supp. 803 (1915) ; Miller v.
Crown Perfumery Co., supra note 37; Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 654, 33
Atl. q64 (i89.5): Zinn v. Baxter. supra note 118 and cases there cited.
In Dill v. Johnston, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 6o8 (1919) (corporation out of business,
defendant had converted all corporate assets to his own possession). Cf. Thompson v.
Stanley, 2o N. Y. Supp. 317 (1892). In Baillie v. Columbia Gold Mining Co., 86 Ore. I, i9,
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Asserting as he does a right not his own, the common-law side of the
court will not hear the minority stockholder.122  But his right to sue in
equity in a proper case was recognized long ago.123
It is generally stated that as a condition precedent to the maintenance
of such a suit it must appear that redress cannot be obtained within the
corporation, 124 but in so far as intra-corporate controversies are concerned
this requirement is not substantial. Proof of a prior demand is not insisted
upon where the alleged wrongdoers are in control of the corporation or it
is obvious that prior demand upon the corporation would have been futile.'2"
Who may sue.
The suit may be maintained only by one who is a stockholder at the
time of the prosecution of the suit.126  This does not necessarily mean a
stockholder of record, actual ownership is sufficient; 127 as is ownership of
166 Pac. g65, 970 (917), the court said, "We have found a few cases in which stockholders
have sued on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated for the redress of wrongs
done the corporation, in which the court has in effect directed a dividend, by requiring the un-
faithful maiority to nay the minority its aliquot share of moneys taken from the corporate
treasury: (citing cases). The doctrine of these cases is applicable only where the court can
say that the powers of the directors will be abused to the injury of the complaining stock-
holders and that the circumstances clearly call for the declaration of a dividend."
' Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. 371 (Mass. 1847) ; Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
i85 Mass. 422, 7o N. E. 444 (19o4) ; Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415 (1855) ; Allen v. Curtis,
26 Conn. 455 (1857); Craig v. Gregg, 83 Pa. 19 (1876) ; Howe v. Barney, 45 Fed. 668
(C. C. D. Ohio i8gi); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S.
261, 37 Sup. Ct. 5o9 (1917); Hubbard v. Kensington Bank, 228 App. Div. 790, 24o N. Y.
Supp. 45 (1930), aff'd 254 N. Y. 587, 173 N. E. 878 (193o). In a proper case a suit com-
menced on the law side may be transferred to the equity side. Jacobs v. First National Bank,
35 F. (2d) 227 (W. D. La. 1929), aff'd 48 F. (2) 17 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
'Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222 (N. Y. 1832); Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331
(U. S. 1855) ; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1882) ; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich.
97, 53 N. W. 218 (1892) ; Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho Ioo, 72 Pac. 733 (1903).
I See Note (I93I) 15 MINN. L. Rv. 453. For the federal courts the requirements
are embodied in Equity Rule 27, 28 U. S. C. A. (1928). See comments on said rule in
BALLANTIIn, CORPORATIONS (1930) 624-625; 4 COOIC, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. ig23) § 74o.
Quaere, whether even in the federal courts the rule applies to actions brought by a stock-
holder to prevent the doing of an illegal act. See Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co.,
114 Fed. 232, 242-3 (C. C. D. N. J. I9o2), aff'd 1ig Fed. 871 (C. C. A. 3d, I9O3), certiorari
denied 191 U. S. 567, 24 Sup. Ct. 840 (1903) ; General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry.
Co., 2-o Fed. 16o. 1.74 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
'The cases are legion. See 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 741; 13 FITCHF_,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 5965; 6 THrOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1827) § 4596. Federal
Equity Rule 27 does not apply to suits against the corporation's own formal proceedings
Binney v. Cumberland Ely Copper Co., 183 Fed. 650 (C. C. D. Me. 191o). If the corporation
is no longer actively engaged in business, prior demand is not necessary. Crumlich's Adm'r
v. Shen. Val. R. R. Co., 28 W. Va. 623 (1886) ; Dill v. Johnston, supra note 121 ; Thompson
v. Stanley, supra note 121; Tennessee M. P. & M. Co. v. Ayers, 43 S. W. 744 (Tenn. i8g7).
But if the corporation continues in being the demand is necessary, although the corporation
is legally dissolved. Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 489, 8 Sup. Ct. 1192 (i888). If there
are no officers or directors the demand should be made upon the stockholders or liquidating
trustees. Watts v. Vanderbilt, 45 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o). See Note (193) 40
YALE L. J. lo8i.
'Edelstein v. Frank, 2o8 App. Div. 79o (N. Y. 1924). But see Porter v. Healy, :?44
Pa. 427, 9i Atl. 428 (1914).
" O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 67, 59 Atl. 321 (9o4), aff'd 68
N. J. Eq. 68o, 62 Atl. 408 (igo5) ; Parrott v. Byers, 4o Colo. 614 (1871) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Pritchard, i9o N. Y. Supp. 871 (ig2i), mod. & aff'd 2ol App. Div. 142, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 486 (1922) ; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 62 How. Pr. 490 (N. Y. 1882) ; Mitchell
v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358 (1915). Contra: Brown v. Duluth M. &
N. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. 889 (C. C. D. Minn. 1893) ; Hodges v. U. S. Steel Corp., 64 N. J. Eq. 9o,
53 Atl. 6ol (19o2), rezd on other grounds, 64 N. J. Eq. 807, 54 Atl. I (19o3).
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stock not validly issued.128  But a mere stock subscription is not.1 29  The
owner of an equitable interest in the stock may maintain the suit even though
the legal title is in another.' 30
When there is more than one plaintiff, the ownership of any one is
sufficient for the prosecution of the action. 131  If the complaining stock-
holder die, the suit, if it be to enforce a corporate right, does not fail, but
may be continued by any other stockholder.1
3 2
One who was a stockholder at the time of the wrongs complained of
may not maintain the suit after he has parted with his stock.133
On the question whether the plaintiff must also have been a stock-
holder at the time of the consummation of the wrongs complained of, there
is a division of authority. The federal courts, anxious to prevent collusive
resort to them in preference to the local courts, insist upon this and the re-
quirement is embodied in a rule. 1 34  Although this rule is only one of prac-
tice and in no sense binding upon the state courts it has nevertheless
influenced some of them to adopt the requirement as a matter of principle. 3 5
The prevailing state court view is probably to the contrary. 136
'McMillan v. Lamb, 166 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1917).
Busey v. Hooper, 35 Md. I5 (1871).
Butler v. Butler Bros., 242 N. W. 701, 702, 704 (Minn. 1932) ; Baum v. Sporborg, 146
App. Div. 537, 131 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1911); McGeary v. Brown, 23 S. D. 573, 122 N. W.
6o5 (19o9); U. S. etc. v. O'Grady, 75 N. J. Eq. 301, 71 AtI. lO4O (igog); Chandler v.
Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 162 Atl. 63 (Del. Ch. 1932). Both the pledgor, Fisher v. Patton,
34 S. W. 1O96 (Mo. 1896), and the pledgee, First National Bank v. Stribling, 86 Pac. 512
(Okla. i9o5), have sufficient interest in the stock to sue. Contra: Whitaker v. Whitaker
Iron Co., 238 Fed. 98o (N. D. W. Va. 1916) (legatee under will). As to status of a naked
trustee see Greenough v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 64 Fed. 22 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1894).
Holmes v. Camp, 176 App. Div. 771, I6z N. Y. Supp. 104 (1917).
Spring v. Webb, 227 Fed. 481 (D. Vt. 1915).
Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N. Y. 107, 71 N. E. 778 (19o4) ; Zinn v. Baxter, supra note 118;
Dissette v. Lawrence Pub. Co., 9 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) ii8 (1907) ; Rafferty v. Donnelly, 197
Pa. 423, 47 Atl. 202 (igoo). One who was wrongfully induced to part with his stock to
the defendants may maintain the suit and therein be restored to his original status. Price
v. Union Land Co., 187 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
Equity Rule 27. The rule applies to an action commenced in a state court and re-
moved to the federal court because of diversity of citizenship. Venner v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 153 Fed. 4o8 (S. D. N. Y. i9o7), aff'd 2o9 U. S. 24, 24 Sup. Ct. 28 (i9o8) ; Hitchings
v. Cobalt Central Mines Co., i8g Fed. 241 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. igio). But not where the
removal is on the ground that a federal question is involved. Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry.
Co., 55 F. (2d) 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). See supra note 124.
Boldenwick v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (19o7) ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,
67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1O24 (19o3) ; Rankin v. Southwestern Brewery & Ice Co., 12 N. M.
54, 73 Pac. 614 (19o3) ; Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536, 8 8. E. 63o (1888) (stock pur-
chased while litigation pending, decision also strongly influenced by other factors such as
laches).
' Montgomery Light & Power Co. v. Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. ioo6 (1898); Just
v. Idaho Canal & Imp. Co., I6 Idaho 639, io2 Pac. 381 (19o9); City of Chicago v. Cameron,
22 Ill. App. 91 (1886), aff'd 120 Ill. 447, II N. E. 899 (1887); Forrester v. Boston & Mon-
tana Cons. Copper Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229 (iR98) ; Winsor v. Bailey, 55 N. H. 218
(1875) ; Pollitz v. Gould, 2o2 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. io88 (1911) ; Santen v. United States Shoe
Co., 25 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 363 (1924); Rafferty v. Donnelly, supra note 133. Where the
action is based on a state statute the federal court will apply the rule governing in that state.
Hand v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., supra note 134.
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While it is frequently stated that the extent of plaintiff's stockholding
in the corporation is immaterial, 3 7 it seems that this is only true where the
defendants are guilty of illegality or fraud'13a and the plaintiff's right is an
absolute one. If the plaintiff's financial interest in the corporation is small,
that factor unmistakably influences the court, 1 9 especially in the considera-
tion ,of discretionary matters.
1 40
Discussion of the time when the plaintiff acquired his stock and the
extent of his financial interest in the corporation is frequently coupled with
the more inclusive question of his motives in litigating.1 41  Although there
are cases holding that a minority stockholder's suit may not be maintained
where the plaintiff is acting not on his own behalf or on behalf of the cor-
poration but rather at the behest of an adverse interest, 142 the general
rule is that the plaintiff's motive in prosecuting the suit, or in acquiring the
stock is immaterial. 43
I'Meyerhoff v. Banker's Securities, Inc., 1o5 N. J. Eq. 76, 147 Atl. 1o5 (1929); Gordon
v. Brucker, 2o8 Ill. App. 188 (917); Carver v. So. Iron & Steel Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 81, 78
Atl. 240 (i9IO) ; Stewart v. Erie & Western Tr. Co., 17 Minn. 372 (1871) ; Gifford v. N. J.
R. R. Co., io N. J. Eq. 171 (I854) Cf. Tanner v. Lindell Ry. Co., ISo Mo. 1, 79 S. W.
155 (1904), as to form of relief. The principles here set forth relate also to the number
of dissenters. For the purpose of federal jurisdiction, it is sufficient if the value of the
corporation's right exceeds $3,000; the value of the plaintiff's undivided interest therein is
immaterial. Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 4th,
1924). Cf. Cohn v. Cities Service Co., 45 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o), where plain-
tiffs were asserting individual or "class" rights but not a corporate right. See Blume, Juris-
dictional Amount in Representative Suits (1931) 15 MinN. L. Rav. 501, 510.
' Even in fraud cases that factor is "a negative circumstance entitled to some consider-
ation". Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, I4 Atl. 425 (1928).
an Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., supra note go; Collins v. Martin, 248 S. W. 941
(Mo. 1922); Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933 (C. C. A. gth, 1919); General
Invest. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N. J. Eq. 235, 100 Atl. 347 (1917); Colby v.
Equitable Trust Co., supra note I5; Callaway v. Powhatan Imp. Co., 95 Md. I77, 52 Atl. 916
(19o2); Rumney v. Detroit & M. Cattle Co., 116 Mich. 64o, 74 N. W. 1O43 (18g8); Albers
v. Merchants' Exchange, 45 Mo. App. 2o6 (1891) ; Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co.,
189 Fed.'791 (C. C. D. Del. 1911).
'11 General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., supra note 124; Johnson v. United
Railways, 227 Mo. 423, 127 S. W. 63 (191o); Ryan v. Williams, 1oo Fed. 172 (C. C. E.
D. Va. 19oo); Becker v. Hoke, 8o Fed. 973 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897); Greenough v. Alabama
G. S. R. Co., supra note 130; Aldrich v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 244, 87 Atl.
65 (1913). In the last cited case a receiver pendente lite was denied even though the directors
had no financial interest in the corporation.
'tFor a collection of cases Note (193o) 67 A. L. R. x47o.
'Forrest v. Manchester, Sheff. & L. Ry. Co., 4 DeG. F. & J. 126 (Eng. 1861); Be-
shoar v. Chappelle, 6 Colo. App. 323, 4o Pac. 244 (1895); Waterbury v. Merchants Union
Exp. Co., 5o Barb. 157 (N. Y. 1867); Belmont v. Erie Ry. Co., 52 Barb. 637 (N. Y. 1869).
Cf. Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Latta & Happer, 193 S. W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917). See also Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Ry. Co., .4 Pa. 401. 4.52 (867).
"3 Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., 36 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. Ist, 193o) ; Central R. R.
Co. v. Collins, 4o Ga. 582 (1869); Macon Gas Co. v. Richter, 143 C 397, 85 S. E. 112
(1913) ; Hodge v. U. S. Steel Corp., 64 N. J. Eq. iI1, 53 AtI. 553 (19o2) ; Bull v. Inter-
national Power Co., 84 N. J. Eq. 6, 92 Atl. 796 (1914), aff'd 85 N. J. Eq. 206, 96 AtI. 364
(igi5) ; Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 398 (N. Y. 187o) ; Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.,
io Beav. I (Eng. 1846) ; Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 459 (1867) . This principle does
not prevent inquiry to ascertain whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest. MacGinniss
v. Boston & Montana C. C. & S. M. Co., 29 Mont. 428, 75 Pac. 89 (igo4). Plaintiff's motive
may influence the form of relief accorded him. Kingman v. Rome, W. & 0. R. R. Co., 30
Hun 73 (N. Y. 1883) ; Lewisohn Bros. v. Anaconda Copper M. Co., 26 Misc. 613, 56 N. Y.
Supp. 8o7 (1899) ; and may be considered on questions of credibility, Continental Securities
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Bars.144
Even if there be a valid corporate right of action the assertion of it by
a particular stockholder may be barred by his own prior conduct. Logically
this position is in apparent disregard of the basic nature of the derivative
suit, namely, that it is brought to redress a corporate wrong and not for the
individual benefit of the stockholder who happens to be plaintiff. From
this notion it ought perhaps, in strict logic to follow that the suit can only
be barred by action on the part of the corporation, but such is not the law.
Courts of equity have refused to permit the assertion of corporate rights
by a stockholder who was personally estopped, 145 who had knowingly ac-
cepted benefits under the transaction sought to be attacked,146 who had rati-
fied or acquiesced in the transaction, 14 7 or who had otherwise waived his
right to complain,' 48 or was guilty of laches.3' 9
Freedom from these bars need not be pleaded by the plaintiff.ao They
constitute affirmative defenses which must be pleaded by the defendants
unless they sufficiently appear upon the face of the complaint,-1 although a
court may, on its own motion, take cognizance thereof. 152  Of course, their
Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 144 N. Y. Supp. 8ol (I913), aff'd I68 App. Div. 483, 154
N. Y. Supp. 54 (1915), aff'd 222 N. Y. 673, 119 N. E. 1O36 (i918). We are not here con-
cerned with the special rules applicable to proceedings to obtain access to corporate books
and records. See .5 FmlcHER, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 18.
" The author uses the word "bars" rather than "defenses" to distinguish between mat-
ters which go only to the right of the particular plaintiff to complain (bars) and matters
which go to defeat the claim itself (defenses).
I Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., 2o7 N. Y. 113, ioo N. E. 721 (1921) ; Post v. Beacon
Vacuum Pump & E. Co., 84 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. Ist, 1898); Klein v. Independent Brewing
Assn., 231 Ill. 594, 83 N. E. 434 (1908). See also Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190
N. Y. Supp. 6i (I92i).
'Wormser v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 184 N. Y. 83, 76 N. E. 1O36 (19o6). See
also Harris v. Pearsall, smpra note 145.
7 Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., supra note 145; Burden v. Burden, supra note 36; Venner
v. N. Y. C. & H. R R Co, 177 App. Div. 296, 164 N. Y. Supp. 626 (1917), aff'd 226 N. Y.
583, 123 N. E. 893 (I919) ; Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., supra note 143; Pigeon River
Ry. Co. v. Champion Fibre Co., 280 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 4th, 122) ; Watt's Appeal, 78 Pa.
370 (1875). Contra: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & Mallory Const. Co., 41 Neb. 374,
58 N. W. 858 ('894); Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N. Y. Supp. 351 (o9) (as to
acts wala prohibita or naza in se). See also Harris v. Pearsall, smprd note 145. When a
trustee seeks to bar his cestui by "ratification", it must appear that he made full disclosure,
not only of the facts, but also of the cestui's legal rights. See Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land
& Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 27o Pac. 1O44 (1928).
"Johnson v. King-Richardson Co., supra note 143.
"Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 19o3) ; Venner v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R. Co., supra note 147; Stephany v. Mariden, 75 N. J. Eq. 90, 71 Atl. 598 (Igo8),
aff'd 76 N. J. Eq. 611, 75 Atl. 899 (19oo) ; Ashhurst's Appeal, 6o Pa. 290 (x869). As to
what constitutes laches see Cahall v. Burbage, iig Atl. 574 (Del. Ch. 1922). At times the
application of the doctrine of laches is made to depend upon whether the relief sought is a
matter of right or of discretion. See Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., supra note x45; American
Seating Co. v. Bullard, 29o Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
' Horn Silver Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 44 N. W. 56 (1889) ; Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont, 2o6 N. Y. 7, 11, 99 N. E. 138, 140 (1912).
'a Sabre v. United Traction & Elec. Co., 156 Fed. 79 (C. C. D. R. I. 19o7). The burden
of proof is likewise upon the defendants. Mason v. Carrothers, io5 Me. 392, 408, 74 Atl. 1O3O,
1037 (909).
I Hall v. Nash, 33 Colo. 5oo, 81 Pac. 249 (igo5). See also Calivado Col. Co. v. Hays,
119 Fed. 202 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 19o2).
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existence bars only the particular plaintiff against whom they operate and
does not affect other stockholders even if they be co-plaintiffs. 15 3
As the suit may be barred by the personal disabilities of the plaintiff
notwithstanding its representative character so the individual plaintiff may,
until others intervene, 1 4 deal with it as if it were his own, at least until
decree entered, and may discontinue it.155
In accordance with the idea that the purchaser of stock acquires all the
rights of the vendor, including the right to attack prior transactions, it is
field that where a prior owner of the stock has participated in or consented
to the alleged improprieties, no subsequent owner of that stock may attack
them.1 5 Under present marketing conditions this principle has an element
of unfairness in it, if we accept the view that a stockholder should be per-
mitted to sue for prior wrongs, because it is most rare for a purchaser to
have any direct contact with his transferor, or any knowledge of his actions
as stockholder. Indeed, the purchaser generally neither knows nor cares
whose stock he is purchasing.
157
'Endicott v. Marvel, supra note 119.
I Except when denied because of undue delay, McArdell v. Olcott, 62 App. Div. 127, 70
N. Y. Supp. 93o (igoi) ; Streuber's Appeal, 229 Pa. 184, 78 Atl. io6 (19io), the right of
intervention is freely granted. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogart, supra note 29. Indeed, no
formal order is necessary. Coltrane v. Templeton, io6 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 4th, igoi). Cf.
Hay v. Brookfield, i6o App. Div. 277, 145 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1914), denying leave to a
majority stockholder to intervene as a party defendant. Where the plaintiff is acting for the
controlling interests, other stockholders will be permitted to intervene. Thayer v. Kinder, 45
Ind. App. iii, go N. E. 323 (igog). For a case of intervention by a holder of non-voting
preferred stock, see Hamlin v. Toledo, etc. R. R. Co., 78 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897).
The status of the intervenor may cure defects in jurisdiction. Grant v. Greene Cons. Copper
Co., I69 App. Div. 206, 154 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1915), aff'd 223 N. Y. 655, .Ig N. E. 1053
(1915), but will not destroy or change jurisdiction as originally fixed. Wichita R. R. &
T. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 26o U. S. 48, 43 Sup. Ct. 5i (i92) ; Thouron v. East
Tenn. V. & G. Ry. Co., 381 Fed. 673 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. i889). So too, if the intervenor is
a stockholder, it may save the action even though the original plaintiff is not. Hanna v.
Lyon, supra note 133. After intervent3on the original plaintiff may not abandon or discon-
tinue the suit, and upon his failure to prosecute it the intervenor may. Manning v. Mercan-
tile Trust Co., 37 Misc. 215, 75 N. Y. Supp. 168 (i92) ; Culver Lumber Co. v. Culver, 81
Ark. IO, 99 S. W. 391 (i9o6) ; McAlpin v. Universal Tobacco Co., 57 Atl. 418 (N. J. 1904).
Intervenors may be allowed compensation for their attorneys. Goodman v. Von Cotzhausen,
MY Wis. 351, 1.77 N. W. 618 (i920).
'Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. i85, i N. E. 663 (i885) ; Bernheimer v. Wallace,
i86 Ky. 45g, 217 S. W. 916 (i92o). The last cited case contains a discussion of the court's
duty to protect unrepresented stockholders. The phrase "as if it were his own" is too broad
because it entirely overlooks the essential fiduciary character of the plaintiff. See National
Power & Paper Co. v. Rossman, 122 Minn. 355, 142 N. W. 818 (1913); Whitten v. Dabney,
171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (i915). The effect of his acts upon others will be considered
later.
'Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 91 N. E. 683 (igio) ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,
supra note 135. This is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendants. Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont, supra note I5o. Contra: Trimble v. Amer. Sugar Ref. Co., supra
note 36.
In cases against promoters (reference to which we are avoiding in this paper) an
attempt is frequently made to escape from the consequences of this rule by treating the initial
issuance to the promoters, in those cases where they immediately return or make available to
the corporation stock for public sale, as a mere subterfuge. California-Calaveras Min. Co.
v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285, r49 Pac. 595 (i915) ; Mason v. Carrothers, supra note 151; Fred.
Macey Co. v. Macey, 143 Mich. 138, io6 N. W. 722 (i9o6) ; American Forging Co. v. Wiley,
2o06 Mich. 664, 173 N. W. 515 (i919) ; Santen v. U. S. Shoe Co., .qpra note I36; Anderson
v. Johnson, 45 R. I. i7, 119 Atl. 642 (923) ; Pittsburgh Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307,
42 N. W. 259 (i889) ; Pietsch v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, ioi N. W. 388 (19o4). See Berle,
Bankers' and Pronwters' Stock Profits (i929) 42 H, v. L. REv. 748, 756-759.
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Necessary Defendants.
The corporation is a necessary party to the suit 158 but neither all the
directors nor even all the alleged wrongdoers are indispensible parties.15 9
Venue.
Homage is still paid to the general rule that "courts will not take juris-
diction of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, or, in the exercise of
visitorial powers, interfere with, supervise, administer, or direct the man-
agement of such a corporation",1 0 and where convenient, in deference to this
principle, it is best to sue in the state of domicile.' 6 The principle can not,
however, be deemed an absolute bar to the maintenance of such suits else-
where. In the first place, there is no uniformity in the decisions as to what
constitute "internal affairs". Secondly, a distinction is frequently drawn be-
tween "controlling" management and "redressing" mismanagement. Finally,
and of prime importance, the rule has come to be recognized as not one of
jurisdictional powers but only as one of policy and discretion. The result
is that "foreign" courts do exercise their jurisdiction in a "proper" case.
Broadly speaking, more and more weight is being given to the actual facts
of the corporation's business activities as distinguished from its merely for-
mal domicile.16 2  A court which acquires jurisdiction of the necessary de-
fendants will decline to act, if satisfied that a grievance exists, only in cases
where "considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice point to the
City of Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1874) ; Porter v. Sabin, 149 -U. S.
473, 13 Sup. Ct. 1oo8 (1892) (receiver of insolvent corporation should be joined) ; Lawrence
v. Southern Pacific Co., i8o Fed. 822 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 19io) appeal dismissed sub nor.
Bogart v. So. Pac. R. R. Co., 228 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 497 (1913) ; Hyams v. Old Dominion
Co., 204 Fed. 681 (D. Me. 1913), aff'd 209 Fed. 8o8 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913); McNeely v. E. I.
DuPont deNemours Powder Co., 263 Fed. 252 (D. Del. 192o); Busch v. Mary A.
Riddle Co., 283 Fed. 443 (D. Del. 1922) ; Beach v. Cooper, 72 Cal. 99, I3 Pac. 161 (1887) ;
Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N. E. 68o (19o5); McMillan v.
Miller, 177 Mich. 511, 143 N. W. 631 (1913) ; Robinson v. Smith, supra note 123; Brady v.
Meenan, 2o4 App. Div. 390, 198 N. Y. Supp. 177 (i923). Cf. Toledo Traction, Light &
Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N. D. Ohio 1913). With respect to dissolved corpora-
tions see (1931) 40 YALE L. J. io8i; Hamm v. Christian Herald Corporation, 236 App. Div.
639, 26o N. Y. Supp. 74.3 (1932).
"9 Eldred v. American Palace-Car Co., 99 Fed. 168 (C. C. D. N. J. igoo) ; Wickersham v.
Crittenden, 93 Cal. 17, 28 Pac. 788 (1892); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, supra
note 158; Baker v. Baker, 122 Misc. 757, 2o4 N. Y. Supp. II (1924), aff'd 212 App. Div. 85o
(1924). Cf. Harden v. Eastern States Pub. Service Co., 14 Del. Ch. 156, 122 Atl. 705 (923)
(corporation sole defendant). As to the propriety of their joinder see Berwind v. Van Home,
1O4 Fed. 581 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19oo) ; Schell v. Alston Mfg. Co., 149 Fed. 439 (C. C. N. D.
Ill. i9o6) ; Gray v. Fuller, 17 App. Div. 29, 44 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1897) ; McCrea v. McClena-
han, 114 App. Div. 70, 99 N. Y. Supp. 689 (i9o6) (as to stockholders).
'0 The cases are annotated in Note (1922) 18 A. L. R. 1383 and discussed in Note (1929)
29 CoL L. REv. 968. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 69.
'As to the jurisdiction of the federal court in such state see Doctor v. Harrington, 196
U. S. 579, 25 Sup. Ct. 355 (19o5) ; Mills v. City of Chicago, 143 Fed. 43o (C. C. N. D. Ill.
i9o6), aff'd 2o4 U. S. 321, 27 Sup. Ct. 286 (19o7) ; Dodge v. Woolsey, supra note 123; Con-
sumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Quinby, 137 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o5); New Albany Water-
works v. Louisville Banking Co., 122 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o3) ; Barnes v. Kornegay,
62 Fed. 67I (C. C. W. D. N. C. I894).
" See dissent of Mr. Justice Stone in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 69.
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courts of the state of the domicile as appropriate tribunals for the determina-
tion of the particular case".
1 63
Even if jurisdiction is entertained in a foreign state, the law of the
forum will not necessarily govern; on certain questions the law of the domi-
cile of the corporation will control,13 4 and on others the law of the place of
performance of the acts involved. 165
Form of Relief.166
A cause of action being established, it may be assumed that the court
will "find the means of enforcing its decree" and that its powers will prove
"as extensive as the exigencies of the case". 16- 7  There is the whole array of
equitable decrees to choose from and each case will be given "such remedy
as its circumstances may require". 168  In making its decree the court is not
circumscribed by any arbitrary designations of the precise form of relief;
it may vary, qualify, restrain, and modify the remedy it applies so as to
do equity".' 69
When the action is strictly derivative the plaintiff can be granted only
such relief as could be granted the corporation if it were plaintiff.1 70 And
conversely, in such a suit the plaintiff cannot be compelled to accept less than
the corporation would be entitled to receive.
17
1
The most commonly sought forms of redress are injunctions against
threatened acts 172 and an accounting for past wrongs.1 73  Occasionally re-
I Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 69; Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 437-439.
'"Voorhees v. Mason, 243 Ill. 256, 9I N. E. io56 (igio) ; Orton v. Edson Red. Mach.
Co., 5 Ohio C. C. (x. S.) 540, aff'd 75 Ohio St. 580, 8o N. E. 1126 (1905). See also Rogers
v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 69, where the refusal of a "foreign" court to exercise juris-
diction because the case involved questions of law of the state of domicile was sustained.
Cf. Hamm v. Christian Herald Corp., supra note i58.
1w Old Dominion Copper M. & S. Co. v. Bigelow, 2o3 Mass. 159, 173-174, 89 N. E.
193, 200 (1909).
"' In this section we shall not attempt to be exhaustive; reference is made to the standard
texts on equity pleading and practice. All the cases noted in this paper illustrate the forms
of relief available. In the next succeeding notes we shall merely refer to a few more illus-
trative cases.
'17Wickersham v. Crittenden, supra note 159.
"I' Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Min. Co., supra note 3o, at 544.
30Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., supra note 15, at 781. But a court will not
work up a case out of the facts to give the plaintiff relief which he does not ask. Tanner v.
Lindell Ry. Co., supra note 137. We have already noted how the form of relief may be
affected by the plaintiff's bad faith, supra note 143, or by his laches, supra note 149.
1-, Collins v. Penn-Wyoming CoppeO Co., 203 Fed. 726 (D. Wyo. 1912) ; Viley v. Wall,
159 La. 627, 105 So. 794 (1925).
"'E. g., money damages for his individual loss. Morris v. Elyton Land Co., 125 Ala.
263, 28 So. 51 (1899). Cf. Binney v. Cumberland Ely Copper Co., supra note 125, and Penn-
sylvania decisions cited suora note 84.
'- Smith v. Chase Baker Piano Mfg. Co., supra note iz; Davidson v. American Blower
Co., 243 Fed. 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 176 N. Y. Supp.
233 (I919), aff'd 227 N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919); Schwab v. Potter Co., 194 N. Y. 409,
87 N. E. 670 (19o9), aff'g 12o App. Div. 36, 113 N. Y. Supp. 439 (1909).
1 Sage v. Culver, supra note 33; Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, I11 N. E. 229 (1915);
Major v. American Malt & Grain Co., supra note iii: Fredendall v. Schrader, 45 Cal. App.
719, 188 Pac. -8o (192o); Barr v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., supra note 18.
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dress against past acts is to be had by way of rescission 174 and future cor-
rect conduct is enforced by a decree of specific performance."'
The forms of relief most peculiar to corporate litigation, and the most
drastic available, are the appointment of a receiver and its compulsory dis-
solution.
The power of a court of equity, independent of statute, to appoint a
receiver of a solvent, going concern can no longer be doubted.' 76  But it is
still regarded as an extreme remedy to be granted only where clearly neces-
sary 177 and where other forms of equitable relief, such as injunction, are
insufficient. 17s The appointment of a receiver may not be the sole or primary
purpose of the suit, it must be merely provisional to some other ultimate
relief.179 Where necessary, a receiver will be appointed if the directors
are guilty of fraud and mismanagement.180 But the charge of "mismanage-
ment" must be based upon something more than differences of opinion as
to business policies or methods.' 8" Not even past misconduct will necessarily
require the appointment of a receiver; the misconduct of the directors must
be of such a character as to satisfy the court of their unfitness and of the
" Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co., supra note 139; Binney v. Cumberland Ely
Copper Co., supra note 125; Metcalf v. American School Furn. Co., I Fed. II5 (C. C.
W. D. N. Y. 19o3); Morris v. Elyton Land Co., supra note 171; Macgill v. Macgill, 135
Md. 384, io9 Atl. 72 (1919) ; Kidd v. N. H. Traction Co., 72 N. H. 273, 56 Atl. 465 (1903).
The right to rescission is frequently affected by the intervening rights of innocent persons
and rescission is frequently accompanied with an accounting against the wrongdoers. Such
accounting is at times given in lieu of rescission. Cf. Johnson v. United Rys., supra note 140.
' Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 27o Fed. 388 (C. C. A. 9th, I92I), certiorari denied
256 U. S. 694, 41 Sup. Ct. 535 (1921) (compelling a director to convey property to the cor-
poration).
"Burwrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208, 47 Sup. Ct. 576 (1927) ; Colum-
bia N. S. D. Co. v. Washed Bar S. D. Co., 136 Fed. 710 (C. C. E. D. Pa. Io5); Piza v.
Butler, 9o Hun 254, 35 N. Y. Supp. 721 (895)! (statutory action) ; Schipper Bros. C. M.
Co. v. Economy Domestic C. Co., 277 Pa. 356, 121 Atl. 193 (1923) ; Culver Lumber & Mfg.
Co. v. Culver. supra note 1.54 (on aplication of majority stockholder).
' Shera v. Carbon Steel Co., 245 Fed. 589 (D. W. Va. 1917); Collins v. Williamson,
229 Fed. 59 (C. C. A. 6th, 915) ; Thoroughgood v. Georgetown Water Co., 9 Del. Ch. 84,
77 Atl. 72o (191o); Welcke v. Trageser, 131 App. Div. 731, 116 N. Y. Supp. 166 (19o9);
Thalmann v. Hoffman House, 27 Misc. 140, 58 N. Y. Supp. 227 (1899). There is perhaps
a growing liberality as to what constitutes a proper case for the appointment of a receiver.
For a discussion of judicial trends as to this power see Gibbs v. Morgan, supra note 123;
Brent v. B. E. Brister Sawmill Co., 1O3 Miss. 876, 6o So. IOIS (1913); Goodman v. Von
Cotzhausen, supra note 154; Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217
Pac. 3oi (923); Berkshire Pet. Co. v. Moore, 268 S. W. 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). But
see Tachna v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 411, 164 Atl. 413 (1933) (calling a halt
in a creditor's suit).
' Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., supra note 6o; New Albany Water Works v. Louis-
ville Banking Co., supra note 161; United Electric Sec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Co., 68 Fed.
673 (C. C. E. D. La. 1895) ; Moore v. Associated P. & R. Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 97, 121 Atl. 655
(1923) ; Smallwood v. Smith, 197 App. Div. 533, 18g N. Y. Sup'p. 427 (19aI).
"Myers v. Occidental Oil Corp., 288 Fed. 997 (D. Del. 1923) ; Zuber v. Micmac Gold
M. Co., i8o Fed. 625 (C. C. D. Me. 19io) ; Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co., 91 Fed. 942 (C. C.
D. Del. 1898).
'Aiken v. Colorado River I. Co., 72 Fed. 59I (C. C. S. D. Colo. 1896) ; Hallenborg v.
Greene, 66 App. Div. 590, 73 N. Y. Supp. 403 (igoi); Jacobus v. Diamond Soda Water
Mfg. Co.. 94 App. Div. 366. 88 N. Y. Suop. 3o2 (9om).
Hunt v. American Grocery Co., 8o Fed. 7o (C. C. D. N. J. 1897) ; Carson v. Allegany
Window Glass Co., supra note 139; Thomas v. East End Opera House Co., 30 Pitts. L. J.
(. s.) 230 (1899).
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probability of further loss or injuries to the corporation and stockholders.' 8 2
Serious dissension in the corporation may also move a court to appoint a re-
ceiver.' 83
We have already noted that a court of equity may at the suit of minority
stockholders prevent the dissolution of the corporation.'" 4 Will it ever com-
pel a dissolution? There is considerable language in the books to the effect
that, exclusive of statute, a court of equity has no power to compel a dissolu-
tion of the corporation.' If we distinguish between the compulsory sur-
render of its corporate franchise and the winding up of its business as a
going concern,186 it seems that, at least with respect to the latter, the court
has the power,18 7 but, recognizing the gravity of its use, uses it sparingly
and only when absolutely necessary for the adequate protection of the mi-
nority."'
Effect of Decree in One Suit on Other Stockholders.
Where the suit is not merely a personal one 189 but is one on behalf of
the corporation, a judgment obtained on the merits in one stockholder's suit
binds all stockholders. 90 This result does not follow if the first judgment
I Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co., mtpra note 139.
3nEllis v. Penn Beef Co., 9 Del. Ch. 213, go AtI. 666 (1911); Powers v. Blue Grass
Bldg. Co., 86 Fed. 705 (C. C. D. Ky. i898) ; Schipper Bros. Coal M. Co. v. Economy Domes-
tic Coal Co., supra note 176. In most cases where a receiver is appointed on the ground of
dissension there is "a more or less equal division between the contending factions". Note
(1926) 43 A. L. R. 26o; Hlawati v. Maeder-Hlawati Co., supra note 37.
' Suepra note 9.s.
Republican Mountain S. Mines v. Brown, 58 Fed. 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893) ; Sidway v.
Missouri Land & L. S. Co., ioi Fed. 481 (C. C. S. D. Mo. igoo) ; Taylor v. Decatur Mineral
Land Co., 112 Fed. 449 (C. C. N. D. Ala. i9O), aff'd 115 Fed. 1o22 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902);
Pearce v. Sutherland, 164 Fed. 6og (C. C. A 9th, i9og) ; Myers v Occidental Oil Corp., supra
note 179; Benedict v. Columbus Const. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 23, 23 Atl. 485 (i8gi) ; Denike v.
N. Y. R. L. & C. Co., 8o N. Y. 599 (188o) ; Hlawati v. Maeder-Hlawati Co., supra note 37.
Cf. Schipper Bros. C. M. Co. v. Economy D. C., supra note 176.
w Sellman v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., 184 Fed. 977 (C. C. D. Del. igog). See Note
(1931) 44 HARv. L. R-v. 437, 440.
" Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., .supra note 123 (close corporation, dissension, fraud,
mismanagement); Goodman v. Von Cotzhausen, supra note 154 (same situation and em-
phasis upon lack of good business qualities in controlling stockholders) ; Arento v. Blackwell's
D. T. Co., ioi Fed. 338 (C. C. E. D. N. C. igoo), io8 Fed. iO58 (C. C. A. 4th, 19Ol) (at
the suit of majority). In Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 Pac. 665 (i9i6), the
same result was substantially obtained by compelling the corporation which had ceased to
mine but had become a mere holding company to distribute its stock holdings. See also
Note (193IY 44 HARv. L. REV. 437.
' Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, suepra note 175; Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 28o Fed.
297 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; Sellman v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., supra note 186; Bixler
v. Summerfield, 210 Ill. 66, 7o N. E. 1O59 (19o4).
"" Harris v. Pearsall, supra note 145; Colgan v. Fink, 167 App. Div. 718, 153 N. Y. Supp.
239 (915). In Jackson v. Gardiner, 2oo Fed. 113 (C. C. A. Ist, 1912), the importance of
it appearing that the prior suit was on behalf of all who might join therein was stressed.
Cf. Roberts v. Kennedy, 13 Del. Ch. 133, 116 Atl. 253 (1922). For "class" suits, see 34
C. J. 1oo2, § 1422.
'Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Willoughby v. Chicago Junction
Rys. Co., supra note 67; Goodbody v. Delaney, So N. J. Eq. 417, 83 AtI. 988 (1912) ; Grant
v. Greene Cons. Copper Co., supra note 154; Hearst v. Putnam Mining Co., 28 Utah 184, 77
Pac. 753 (19o4) ; Corey v. Independent Ice Co., io6 Me. 485, 76 Atl. 93o (igio) ; Hochman
v. Mortgage Finance Corp., 289 Pa. 26o, 137 Atl. 252 (I927). Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Bogert, supra note 29. The same principle, of course, applies where the corporation itself
acted in the first suit. Alexander v. Donohoe, 143 N. Y. 203, 38 N. E. 263 (1894).
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was obtained by fraud or collusion,191 or, it would seem, if it were entered
merely on consent of the parties thereto without an actual bona fide litiga-
tion having been presented to the court for adjudication.
1 92
Costs and Allowances.
For the purpose of receiving and paying costs the plaintiff is regarded
as an individual plaintiff. 19 3 A successful plaintiff who sues on behalf of
his corporation is entitled to an allowance for his expenditures, including
counsel fees, out of the corporate funds,19 4 but not against the individual de-
fendants except pursuant to statute.'9" The plaintiff is not entitled to such
an allowance where he has recovered only a personal judgment.'9 6 Gener-
ally an allowance is made only where there is an actual recovery by the cor-
poration or a fund is brought into court for distribution.1 9
CONCLUSION
No accumulation of dicta can conceal the fact that intra-corporate con-
troversies have been dropped into the wide lap of the chancellor-for better
or for worse, depending upon his economic statesmanship. Easy familiarity
with the language of the books will not suffice. His powers are wide; his
arsenal adequate. And the measure of his success will not be the logical con-
"Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Rys. Co., supra note 67; Beers v. Denver & R. G.
W. R. Co., 286 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Levy v. Equitable Trust Co., 271 Fed. 49
(C. C. A. 8th, '92'); Gund v. Bullard, 73 Nebr. 547, 1o3 N. W. 309 (imO5) (applying the
exception where in the first suit an issue was not fully or fairly presented).
' Metropolitan Elevated R. R. Co. v. Manhattan Elevated R. R. Co., ii Daly 373 (N. Y.
1884) ; Cutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, I5
r N. E. 167 (1926) ; Spaulding v.
North Milwaukee T. S. Co., io6 Wis. 481, 81 N. W. io64 (igoo). Contra: Zeitinger v.
Hargardine-McKittriep Dry Goods Co., 309 Mo. 433, 274 S. W. 789 ('925); Kaufman v.
Annuity Realty Co., 301 Mo. 638, 256 S. W. 792 (1923). Ralph v. Annuity Realty Co., 325
Mo. 410, 28 S. W. (2d) 662 ((x93o). By analogy: Jenkins v. Robertson, L. R. i Scotch &
Div. App. Cas. 117 (1867) ; Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U. S. 139, 8 Sup. Ct. 1101 (1888) ;
Union Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C. 214, 25 S. E. 966 (1896). See also supra note 155.
' Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co., supra note 179. An intervenor is not liable for costs
accrued before his intervention. Whitten v. Dabney, supra note i55.
'Meeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., supra note z; Beaudette v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 165
N. E. 671 (1929) ; Guay v. Holland System Hull Co., 244 Mass. 240, 138 N. E. 557 (923) ;
cases cited 13 FLTCnra, op. cit. supra note 6, § 6o45. But his agreement with counsel as to
amount is not necessarily binding upon the corporation or the court. Hutchinson Box Board
& Paper Co. v. Van Horn, supra note 137; Saut v. Perronville Shingle Co., 179 Mich. 42,
146 N. W. 212 (914). The same rules apply to an intervenor. Goodman v. Von Cotz-
hausen, supra note 154. See Hartman v. Oatman Gold M. & M. Co., 2 Ariz. 476, igs Pac.
717 (i92i), for an independent suit by a stockholder against corporation to recover expendi-
tures. For cases involving the right of directors to employ counsel in minority stockholder's
suits see Cory v. Independent Ice Co., supra note i92; McConnell v. Combination M. & M.
Co., 31 Mont. 563, 79 Pac. 248 (I9O5); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., supra note 44;
Kannenberg v. Evangelical Creed Cong., 146 Wis. 6Io, 131 N. W. 353 (i9II).
" Kilby v. Movius L. & L. Co., 55 N. D. 830, 215 N. W. 284 (1927).
10 Boothe v. Summit Coal M. Co., 72 Wash. 679, 131 Pac. 252 (913) ; Joyce v. Congdon,
114 Wash. :39, 195 Pac. 29 (i92I).
'Alexander v. Atlantic & W. P. R. R. Co., 113 Ga. 193, 38 S. E. 772 (190i) (attor-
neys' fees not allowed in action resulting in injunction against ultra vires acts); Burley
Tobacco Co. v. Vest, x65 Ky. 762, 178 S. W. iIOZ (1915) (allowances denied where plaintiff
established invalidity of an election of directors). Cf. Forrester & MacGinniss v. Boston &
M. C. C. & S. M. Co., 29 Mont. 397, 76 Pac. 211 (904). It would seem that a court may
properly consider non-tangible benefits resulting to the corporation even if not immediately
serving to increase its physical assets.
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sistency of his opinions but the wisdom and justice he brings into the realm
of economics from the field of law.'98
In the immediate future, it would seem, more attention must be given
to the increasing separation that exists between ownership and control. In
the past, decisions have been strongly influenced by the fact that the majority
which controlled also had the largest financial interest in the corporation.' 99
This is frequently no longer true,20 0 but it does not necessarily follow that
a reversal of any principle is called for. There are counter-balancing fac-
tors. For instance, investment bankers may have a very real and substan-
tial interest in the success of a corporation because the good-will of their
customers is dependent upon it even though they may not directly own any
of its securities. Another factor not yet judicially recognized is that, by
and large, the modern stockholder is an investor primarily interested in
financial return and not a partner in a business venture interested in con-
trolling its policies.201  Older considerations which have not yet exerted
appreciable influence on the law are that corporate charters are no longer
contracts negotiated between the state and the incorporators 202 and that the
concurrence in the terms of the charter and by-laws imposed on the stock-
holders is almost always based upon a legal fiction and not upon an intelli-
gent, free consent in fact.203
Of course, most of the elements here mentioned apply only to the large
"public" corporations and not to "close" corporations. The ever widening
gap in practice between the two classes may require the division of corpora-
tion law into two branches.20 4 A short step toward this is to recognize the
difference between majority control as exercised by a small, compact group,
and that exercised by virtue of a majority vote of a large, widely scattered
body of stockholders.
Beneath and beyond all these considerations is the ultimate obligation
adequately to protect the minority against illegality, fraud and unfairness
For a stimulating and suggestive presentation of some of the legal economic factors
involved in the present corporate system, see BERTZ ANI) MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATIoN
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (932).
=' Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Co., supra note 3i; Barnes v. Brown, So N. Y. 527,
537 (i88o) ; Thalmann v. Hoffman House, supra note 177; Shaw v. Davis, supra note 2o,
at 32&-9; Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N. J. Eq. 2o8, 21 Ati. 847 (i8gi).
Because of the use of bonds, non-voting classes of stock, scattered stock ownership,
and the use of various devices to keep control regardless of the investment. The writer
has in course of ureparation an article on Derpetuating control.
See Kline, spra note 28.
See Katz v. DeWolf, 151 Wis. 337, 344, 138 N. W. 1013, 1015 (1912); Ripin v. U. S.
Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 47, 98 N. E. 855, 856 (1912); (ig3i) 44 HA~v. L. REV. 442.
_As to constructive notice to the public of the contents of certificates of incorporation
and by-laws see Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra
Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 297, 326-327; UNiFORm BusiNzss CoRPoarioNs AcT,
9 U. L. A. (1932) § Io.
' A distinction between corporations whose stock has a ready market and "close" cor-
porations has been accepted as valid in determining whether dividends are being improperly
withheld. See Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Pap~er Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 2gg, 3o9-31o, 6o At.
941, 945 (19o5) ; Hiscock v. Lacy, supra note 30. See also SPELMA , CORPORATE DIECToRs
(i93i) § 9.
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without encouraging the "striker" or litigious stockholder and without ham-
stringing honest management. The courts are alert to the problem.20  A
subtle danger to be guarded against from even honest management is the
feeling which it frequently has that all other stockholders are only parasites
profiting from its labors.20 6  Justified by this psychological attitude it fre-
quently becomes "ingenious in devising methods to evade and avoid [its] cor-
porate responsibilities".20 7  The danger from the minority lies primarily
in the comparative ease with which one bent solely upon personal profit may,
in the role of minority stockholder, invoke the aid of equity whether or not
his action is intended for the best interests of the corporation on whose be-
half he is nominally acting.208 In most cases, it is likely that a fair result
can be reached by the application of proper rules respecting such questions
as the plaintiff's interest in the corporation and his motives. 20 9 It is sug-
gested that in all cases, except where the plaintiff has an unqualified legal
right, if he represents a very small financial interest, the court limit its inter-
ference with the majority to assuring to all stockholders of the same class
equality of treatment, but, if the opposition represents a substantial interest,
(especially if the stock does not have a ready market) the court should
review the fairness and wisdom of the action proposed by the majority,
allowing the majority, if it be honest and "disinterested", a presumption in
favor of its action.210  Ordinarily, if there is an active market for the stock,
a dissatisfied stockholder would prefer to sell his stock rather than litigate
the competence of the majority. Assuming that there has been no dishon-
esty and the prevailing market is a fair one, this might be deemed sufficient
redress. Conversely, it is the existence of a ready market that makes most
stockholders in the large corporations disinterested in managerial problems.
"In proper cases courts protect minorities, even minorities of one, against the oppres-
sion of the majority of stockholders and boards of directors. It sometimes happens, however,
that a minority institute 'strike' suits and seek to oppress majorities and to involve the cor-
poration itself in disaster for purposes of their own and for reasons not always revealed.
So that there are cases in which courts are compelled to protect minorities against majorities
and majorities against minorities." Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454, 457 (C. C. A. 2d,
I916).
Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., supra note 44; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra
note 41.
Clarke, J. in Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., supra note 44. The purpose may
at times be wholly praiseworthy. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 41.
I Even if the motive be the entirely proper one of holding corporations strictly to the
letter of the law, excessive litigiousness may be an undue burden both upon the courts and
the corporations. See SEARs, THE Nmv PLACE OF TE STOCKHOLDER (1929) 199, for cita-
tions of nineteen cases brought by one Clarence H. Venner. The entire problem of reconcil-
ing the right to insist upon the letter of the bond and the requirements of good morals is an
old one still unsolved. See Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N. Y. I, 171 N. E. 884 (I93O).
m' See text supra, page 717 et seq.
' Recent experiences in reorganizations, particularly upon real estate mortgage fore-
closures, has brought sharply to the fore the need for a tribunal to reconcile differences of
opinion between majorities and minorities. See Clinton Trust Co. v. i42-144 Joralemon
Street Corp., decided by the. New York Appellate Division (2d Dept.), Mar. 10, 1933. Arbi-
tration has been turned to. In a recent railroad foreclosure, Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ulster & Delaware R. R. Co., (S. D. N. Y.) pending before him, Circuit Judge Mack
arbitrated some such questions which arose incidentally.
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Similarly, the rules applicable to "motive" ought, perhaps, to be more pre-
cisely formulated. Under the present state of the law, the following are
submitted:
i. Where the majority, the directors, or the officers, are guilty of ille-
gal acts, i. e., of acts which the corporation itself cannot authorize or ratify,
the motive of the complaining stockholder is immaterial.
2. Where the minority stockholder is insisting upon the fulfillment of
a contract right, whether embodied in the charter, certificate of incorpora-
tion, or otherwise, his motive is immaterial. Illustrative of this class are
cases of preferred stockholders seeking the payment of dividends.
3. Where the suit involves the propriety of the exercise of a power
vested in the majority, the directors, or the officers, the motive of the com-
plaining minority stockholder is material (but not controlling), provided the
inquiry is directed towards aiding the court to determine, under all the cir-
cumstances, the effect of the litigation upon the corporation and all inter-
ested therein, and not to the ascertainment of whether the plaintiff is a
"good" or "bad" man. It is submitted that the ultimate welfare of the cor-
poration and of those dependent upon it is a legitimate subject of inquiry
and that courts should make the inquiry openly and not under the guise of
determining whether the plaintiff is "the real party in interest." 211
' See Tachna v. Pressed Steel Car Co., supra note 77, decided after this article was
written.
